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Abstract
Processors are not perfect. Even the most modern, thoroughly verified pro-
cessors contain imperfections. Processor imperfections, being in the lowest
layer of the system, pose a significant problem not only for software devel-
opers during design and debug, but also serve as weaknesses to the security
mechanisms implemented in upper layers. With such a pervasive impact on
computing systems, it is vital that processor vendors address these imperfec-
tions in a way that maintains the abstraction of a perfect processor promised
to software developers.
This thesis proposes SoftPatch, a software-based mechanism for recovering
from processor imperfections that preserves the perfect-processor abstraction
promised to software developers. By combining the low detection latency of
hardware-implemented detectors with lightweight, formally verified software
recovery routines, the SoftPatch maintains the illusion of a perfect proces-
sor in the face of processor imperfections. SoftPatch uniquely leverages the
insights that (1) most of a processor’s functionality is thoroughly verified,
i.e., free from imperfections, (2) the processor has redundant functionality,
and (3) the processor pipeline acts as a checkpointing and rollback mecha-
nism. By leveraging these insights, SoftPatch enables practical patching of
processor imperfections. By reusing existing processor features, SoftPatch
removes the unneeded complexity and overheads required by previous ap-
proaches while still managing to reinforce the perfect-processor abstraction.
To highlight SoftPatch’s ability to recover from a range of processor im-
perfections and to show how systems can be built around SoftPatch, this
dissertation presents the design and evaluation of two processor imperfection
use cases, processor bugs and malicious processors. We implement detectors
for each type of imperfection, one of which we design, and incorporate each
use case’s detector with SoftPatch into a complete detection and recovery
system.
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In general, experiments show that SoftPatch is practical and applicable
to many sources of processor imperfections. Experiments with the processor
bug use case, which we call Erratacator, show that that Erratacator can de-
tect all 16 of the implemented processor bugs and recover from 15. The costs
of processor bug recovery are less than 10% hardware area overhead and no
run time overhead in the case of monitoring a single bug. Processor bug
experiments also show that by exposing the reliability trade-off to software,
Erratacator can monitor several processor bugs simultaneously with over-
heads of less than 10%. Experiments with the malicious processor use case,
which we call BlueChip, show that it is able to prevent all implemented hard-
ware attacks, with no incursion on the software developer. Recovery from
malicious processor test cases has a small run time overhead and approaching
zero hardware area overhead.
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Software developers must trust the processor. When software developers
build a system, they build it upon a set of assumptions. A common assump-
tion that software developers make is that the processor correctly implements
the instruction set specification, i.e., they assume the processor is perfect. It
is vital that this assumption holds because the processor, being the lowest
layer of the system, forms the foundation of any software system. If the pro-
cessor is incorrect, all functionality that depends on it becomes potentially
incorrect.
Contrary to software developers’ assumptions, processors are not perfect—
they have bugs. Modern processors are as complex as modern software. To
create such complexity, processor designers develop processors using a col-
lection of libraries and custom code. Once amassed, the codebase for a
modern processor totals several million lines of code [1], which, when fabri-
cated, results in chips comprised of over a billion transistors [2]. Given such
complexity, completely verifying modern processors is intractable, meaning
each new processor ships with imperfections. For example, Intel’s Core 2
Duo processor has an errata document that lists 129 bugs [3]—known bugs.
Given the production life of the Core 2 Duo, this amounts to more than 2.5
bugs discovered per month.
Another side effect of processor complexity is an increased risk of inten-
tional processor imperfections, referred to as malicious circuits. The millions
of lines of code that create a modern processor make an ideal hiding place
for malicious circuits. Also adding to the threat of malicious circuits is the
trend towards a distributed design model where processor designers respond
to demands for increased complexity by outsourcing the implementation of
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many components to third parties. This requires that processor designers
trust these third parties to be non-malicious. Making concrete the threat of
malicious circuits, King et al. [4] demonstrate how a malicious processor de-
signer or third party can insert small but powerful attacks into the processor
at design time and how an attacker can exploit the attacks at run time to
violate software-level security mechanisms.
Existing techniques that could be used to identify malicious circuits have
many failings. Code reviews are of little help as it is impractical to expect
managers in charge of processor sign-off to visually inspect and understand
every line of code. Sign-off managers cannot rely or conventional verification
either. Conventional verification fails to find all unintentional imperfections,
let alone malicious circuits which are constructed to bypass detection during
verification. The lack trusted designers and the limits of functional verifica-
tion make future processors a prime place for malicious circuits.
Not addressing processor imperfections, malicious or otherwise, breaks the
assumption software developers have of a perfect processor. Violating this as-
sumption has several possible consequences, including protracted debugging
times, functionality and performance differences [5], and most importantly,
security vulnerabilities [6, 7].
1.2 Thesis statement
We propose that we can help software overcome buggy and malicious pro-
cessors by repurposing functionality already available in the processor.
1.3 The BlueChip recovery system
In this dissertation, we present two systems that aide software in overcoming
processor imperfections: one system targeted at helping software overcome
errata-like bugs and one system targeted at helping software overcome ma-
licious circuits inserted into the processor during design time. Each system
uses hardware-implemented detectors that are responsible for identifying im-
perfection activations before they cause damage and a software-implemented
recovery module that is responsible for helping software execute without ac-
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tivating imperfections.
We design the two systems with four key observations in mind:
• Processor imperfections only matter when they affect the ISA-level [8].
The ISA dictates how software interacts with the processor, so if a fault
due to a processor imperfection never makes it to the ISA-level, it will
not impact software’s execution or any system outputs (ignoring side
channels). Thus, the goal of our systems is to remove contaminated
state before it reaches the ISA-level.
• The processor pipeline acts as a checkpointing mechanism for in-flight
state. When an exception occurs, the processor pipeline flushes all
intermediate results, creating a window of time where the hardware can
view the run time state of the system, but software can not. Combining
this observation with the previous observation, we see that if we can
detect the activation of processor imperfections while the state that
they contaminate is in-flight, we can repurpose the processor pipeline’s
flush mechanism to maintain a consistent ISA-level state.
• Most of a processor’s functionality is correct: software can depend on
it. Due to the cost of processor bugs, processor designers extensively
verify most of a processor’s functionality.
• Processors contain a high degree of functional redundancy. There are
many ways to perform the same task using different instruction se-
quences. Combining this observation with the previous observation
means that there is ample opportunity to recode an instruction stream
that activates an imperfection in the processor into a new instruction
stream that does not activate the same imperfection.
With those four observations in mind, we propose a generalized system ar-
chitecture that allows software to overcome buggy and malicious processors.
The first component of the architecture is a detector. The detector monitors
the hardware-level state of processor, looking for activations of processor im-
perfections. When it detects an activation, it creates an exception, causing
the processor to flush in-flight, potentially contaminated, state. To make
sure that no contaminated state makes it to the ISA-level, we require a low-
latency detector. Having this, we know that software will never execute in
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an inconsistent state. But, this may lock the processor since attempting to
execute the same instruction again is likely to re-activate the imperfection.
To help software execute around imperfections, we add a software recov-
ery layer to the system. The recovery layer takes advantage of the functional
redundancy in the processor and the fact that most of the processor’s func-
tionality is correct to recode instructions from the software stack, routing
around the imperfection. The processor, after processing the exception from
the detector, passes control to the recovery layer. The recovery layer re-
codes instructions from the software stack and once execution moves past
the imperfection, it returns control back to the software stack.
To address the patching of errata-like processor bugs, we propose Errata-
cator. Erratacator combines reconfigurable, software-implemented recovery
routines with low latency, dynamically configurable, processor bug detectors
implemented in hardware to form a unified platform. Erratacator maintains a
consistent ISA-level state by connecting previously proposed low-latency pro-
cessor bug detectors [9] to the processor’s pipeline flush mechanism. These
detectors are low enough latency that there is no need for the heavyweight
checkpointing and rollback mechanisms required by software-only bug patch-
ing approaches or the micro checkpoints that slow the commit rate used in
Diva-like approaches [10].
To eliminate the complex and hardware-intensive recovery requirements
of hardware-only processor bug patching approaches, Erratacator employs
formally verified, software-level, recovery routines that sit between the pro-
cessor and the software. The recovery routines act as a middle-man, reading
instructions from software, recoding the instruction streams in an effort to
route execution around the processor bug(s), and finally returning control
back to software.
To address the specific threat of malicious circuits inserted at design time,
we present UCI and BlueChip (an early version of the recovery system used
in Erratacator). We combine UCI and BlueChip to form a hybrid system,
i.e., design-time detection (UCI) and run-time recovery(BlueChip), for de-
tecting and neutralizing potentially malicious circuits. At design time, UCI
flags as suspicious, any unused circuitry (any circuit not activated by any of
the many design verification tests) and removes their output from the proces-
sor, deactivating them. However, these seemingly suspicious circuits might
actually perform a legitimate functionality within the processor, so BlueChip
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inserts circuitry to raise an exception whenever one of these suspicious cir-
cuits would have been activated. BlueChip then takes over as an exception
handler and is responsible for simulating software-level instructions in effort
to nudge the state of software forward, past the suspicious circuit.
Both of the implemented systems push the complexity of coping with buggy
and malicious processors up to a higher, more flexible, and adaptable layer
in the system stack, silently maintaining software’s assumption of a perfect
processor. The key to making this possible with a low software run time
overhead is repurposing functionality that ships with the processor.
1.4 Contributions
This section provides a discussion of each major contribution of the work
covered in this dissertation. Chapters 4 and 5 include a more extensive list
of contributions tailored to the reference design being covered in that chapter.
1.4.1 The first arbitrary malicious circuit identification
algorithm targeted at design-time attacks
The computer systems security arms race between attackers and defenders
has largely taken place in the domain of software systems, but as hardware
complexity and design processes have evolved, novel and potent hardware-
based security threats are now possible. We refer to these threats as malicious
circuits.
Previous attempts at addressing the threat of malicious circuits focused on
supply chain attacks where they assume the existence of a golden version of
the hardware [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. We, instead, look at preventing malicious
circuits at design time, where there is no golden reference of how the hardware
should behave. Our work is unique from previous research on malicious
circuits included at design time because we target arbitrary malicious circuits,
while others target specific attack vectors [16].
To identify malicious circuits at design time, we developed UCI. UCI de-
tects suspicious circuits based on the observation that attackers want to
ensure that their attacks are not triggered during verification. We evaluated
UCI using three malicious circuits (which we also created) that we added to
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the Leon3 processor. In less than an hour, UCI was able to detect all three
malicious circuits, while identifying less than 1% of the processor circuitry
as suspicious.
This work stemmed follow-on work by other researchers [17, 18], focusing
more attention on the problem of detecting arbitrary malicious inclusions at
design time.
1.4.2 The first to remove suspicious functionality from a
processor and use software-level repair to route software
execution around the removed functionality
We design an automatic tool to help processor designers cope with the suspi-
cious circuits identified during UCI analysis. This tool removes the threat of
suspicious circuits by detaching them from the trusted circuitry. Detaching
the suspicious circuits from the trusted circuit makes it impossible for the
suspicious circuit to influence the trusted circuit. The problem is that the
removed circuits may be part of non-malicious functionality. To protect soft-
ware from state contamination due to the detached circuitry, our automatic
system inserts logic that raises an exception whenever one of the detached
circuits would have been activated. The exception handler then becomes
responsible for implementing the missing functionality—at the ISA-level of
abstraction—that software needs to continue execution.
We evaluate the system using the results from UCI analysis on our three
malicious circuits added to the Leon3 processor and three common programs
(make, djpeg, and wget) running on Linux. Results show that the system
is able to protect the processor from the malicious circuit while at the same
time help software make forward progress. Results also show that if the
added protections are off the critical timing path for the processor, that
both hardware area and power overheads approach zero. In terms of the
impact on software, the average run time overhead was less than 1%.
Our contribution here is two-fold. First, we distinguish ourselves from pre-
vious work by detaching suspicious circuits. We can detach circuits safely be-
cause our recovery software is able to emulate around the removed hardware.
In contrast, previous design time defenses used firewalls to limit interactions
between untrusted and trusted components [19, 16]. The second contribu-
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tion is that our experimental results show that it is possible and practical to
push the complexity of coping with malicious hardware up to a higher, more
flexible, and adaptable layer in the system stack.
1.4.3 The first implementation and evaluation of a
signature-based processor bug detector
In an effort to address the over 70% of modern processor bugs that con-
ventional mechanisms fail to patch [20], previous research proposed using
signature-based bug detectors to identify bug activations [9, 21, 20]. The
authors of the competing signature-based detectors evaluated their propos-
als using errata-like bugs to determine, for each bug, how many signals they
would have to monitor to detect the bug. The authors stopped short of
implementing their detector in hardware and evaluating its run time perfor-
mance.
Our goal was to learn explore the run time behavior of signature-based
detectors, especially the effects of monitoring multiple bugs concurrently. To
this end, we implemented 16 bugs in a popular open source processor and
ran benchmarks.
Experiments with 9 errata-like bugs from a popular processor show that
the detectors can detect all implemented bugs. Running a series of embedded
system benchmarks on top of Linux shows that the detectors can monitor
a single bug without producing false detections. When we run that same
test setup, but try to detect an increasing number of bugs, we show, for the
first time, that contention among bugs for the limited bug detector resources
creates an overwhelming number of false detections. Specifically, results show
that when monitoring the first five bugs, every instruction causes the bug
detectors to fire. We also explore the implications of adding more intelligence
in determining what bugs are monitored when. By removing a single bug,
that we know software will never trigger, from the set of detectable bugs the
detectors can monitor all nine bugs with less than 900 false detections per
second—a lower frequency than the timer tick on some Linux machines.
Our main contribution here is learning about the scaling difficulty that
these types of signature-based detectors have, motivating future work. We
also show that software-level recovery is possible on buggy processors.
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1.5 Organization
In the next chapter (Chapter 2), we present the concepts necessary for un-
derstanding and evaluating the work presented in this dissertation. Chap-
ter 3 covers the work related to protecting software from the implications of
buggy and malicious processors. Chapter 3 also details the work related to
detecting malicious circuits and design time verification strategies, in gen-
eral. Chapter 4 covers the design, implementation, and formal verification of
the BlueChip recovery firmware and provides an evaluation against errata-
like processor bugs. Chapter 5 discusses the design and implementation of
our malicious circuit detection and removal tool and a preliminary version
of BlueChip that operates as a part of the operating system. We look into
possible improvements to the BlueChip recovery system in Chapter 6 and




This chapter covers the background topics required for understanding the
two reference implementations presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
2.1 Trusted Computing Base
According to Lampson et al. [22], the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) for a
system is, “A small amount of software and hardware that security depends
on and that we distinguish from a much larger amount that can misbehave
without affecting security.” We build on this definition by refining security to
mean the security policy of the system. For example, a security policy that
an operating system wants to enforce is that untrusted processes can only
interact with other processes using the operating system’s well-defined inter-
process communication abstractions. The TCB for a generalized operating
system that implements this security policy consists of the processor and
other potentially shared hardware components, the kernel, device drivers,
libraries, and trusted processes. These components amount to millions of
lines of code—both hardware and software—written by many different enti-
ties, with varying levels of verification. With such a large and diverse TCB,
it is intractable for system builders to prove that it is trustworthy; which is
why systems have security vulnerabilities.
Reducing the size of the TCB is a primary goal of secure system designers.
A smaller TCB is easier to reason about or even verify completely. One way
to reduce TCB size is by moving components outside of the TCB, i.e., make
them untrusted. Another way to reduce the size of the TCB is to reduce
the complexity of the trusted components; reducing complexity often yields
more functionally correct and more readily verifiable components.
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Figure 2.1: Processor life-cycle. The green/light boxes represent stages that we
trust, while the red/dark boxes represent stages that we assume are imperfect. We
divide the flow into three parts: (a) The specification part, where trust is
essential, because we base both recovery and the malicious circuit detection tool
on the specification. (b) The functionality part, which we address here and (c)
the supply chain part, which previous, orthogonal work addresses.
2.2 Processor design flow
The life-cycle of a processor consists of several stages, starting from a set of
requirements and an idea, ending-up in users’ machines. Figure 2.1 shows
each stage of the life-cycle, grouped into three broad categories. The green/-
light stages represent trusted stages, while the red/dark stages represent
untrusted stages; the focus of our work is validating trust in the red/dark
stages. For the purposes of this dissertation, we group stages into three
broad categories: specification, functionality, and supply chain. We describe
the steps of each category, the different attack vectors, and how we validate
trust for that category.
The first stage is in a processor’s life-cycle is the specification stage: where
the processor designer specifies the instruction set architecture (ISA), other
functionality (e.g., cache configuration), and the chip’s physical constraints.
Very rarely does this process start with a clean sheet; most specification
stages start with an analysis of previous processors, increasing functionality
and performance. This means the the specification stage is quick compared
to the other stages, but often processor designers must revisit this stage to
refine requirements based on the results of later stages. The result of this
stage is generally a set precisely written documents in natural language.
The resulting specifications are the foundation for the rest of the stages
and for our work. Since there is often little validation of the specification,
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any errors—unintentional or otherwise—made in the specification stage are
likely to carry over into the final physical processor and into our recovery
and detection mechanisms. We, like the processor designers, blindly trust
and abide by the specifications and thus add them to our TCB.
The second group of stages, denoted as b in Figure 2.1, is where proces-
sor designers create and verify the functionality mandate in the specification
stage. Here, processor designers use a hardware description language (HDL)
to create an executable version of the functional specification. The most pop-
ular HDLs are Verilog and VHDL. Both languages allow designers to express
concurrent functionality at a medium level abstraction—registers (hardware
state elements) and simple operations on data as it flows between registers—
and directly deal with an abstract notion of time. After the initial coding
phase completes, the cyclical process of functional verification and recoding
starts. Functional verification often takes the form of simulating the design
and running test cases on the processor. Testing of processor starts at the
module level and completes with a whole system test that uses instructions
as test cases. Some parts of the processor also undergo formal verification.
Whatever the approach, it is intractable to completely test the entire pro-
cessor.
The inability to completely verify a processor’s functionality means that
imperfections slip through to later stages. These imperfections may be bugs
or malicious circuits: intent is the differentiating factor. Because this is the
first practical target for inserting imperfections into the system and because
imperfections from these stages make it into the other stages, we target
our work here; we focus on protecting software from processor imperfections
introduced during the design stage and missed during functional verification.
The final group of stages, denoted as c in Figure 2.1, covers everything
required to get the functionality created in previous stages into the hands
of the end user. The first stage in this group is layout. Layout starts with
synthesis: converting a high-level description of the processor into an equiv-
alent circuit consisting of only primitive elements (e.g., transistors or gates).
Now that the functionality is down to a level of abstraction amenable to fu-
ture stages, processor designers need to layout the primitive circuit elements
so they meet the area, power, and frequency constraints established in the
specification stage. The processor is now ready for the fabrication stage.
The fabrication stage is where the processor comes into physical form. This
11
Figure 2.2: System states and transitions that comprise a simplified version of
the Multi-level Model of Reliability proposed by Parhami [32]. The red/dark
states represent the levels where software is impacted.
stage is very time consuming (second to verification) and the most expensive
mostly due to the non-recurring cost of setting-up the tooling to produce
a single chip. Before fabricated processors start their journey to end users,
they go through a series of physical and functional tests to check for any
flaws introduced during fabrication. The tests are not as complete as those
done during the verification stage and there is less visibility into the the inner
workings of the processor. After passing all the tests, the processor makes
its way to the end user, where it is used.
Imperfections can come from bugs in the tools or through circuits added
surreptitiously [23, 24, 25, 26], much like they would at design time, but at a
lower level of abstraction. While there are many opportunities to insert im-
perfections into the processor in the final group of stages, we rely on previous
work [12, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31] to increase trust.
2.3 Faults, errors, and failures
As shown in Figure 2.2, a processor fault is a defect in the processor that
causes the processor to perform incorrectly at the gate level. Processor faults
cause processor errors when the gate-level fault causes an inconsistent state at
the ISA-level—meaning that the fault has impacted software. If the processor
error prevents software from making forward progress, then we call this a
processor failure.
There are two classes of processor faults: transient and permanent. Tran-
sient faults are processor imperfections that appear and disappear, with some
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probability, over time. The most common model of transient fault used in
research is the Single-Event Upset (SEU): where one bit of the hardware’s
state is flipped. The errors produced by transient faults are called soft er-
rors, because a re-execution of the software sequence impacted by the error
is unlikely to be impacted by the transient fault again.
Permanent faults, on the other hand, are likely to occur in the same way
again and contaminate the same structures. Common sources of permanent
faults are design errors, fabrication errors, and transistor fatigue. Permanent
faults lead to hard errors (more so than transient faults lead to soft errors),
which are more likely than soft errors to lead to processor failures [8]. Because
of the dangers of permanent faults, they are the focus of our work.
2.4 Consistent state
We use the term consistent state as a shorthand for when the processor’s ISA-
level state, also known as software’s state, is equivalent to the ISA-level state
produced by a perfect implementation of the instruction set specification
given the same instruction stream and starting ISA-level state. Without
a consistent state, the same program could produce many different results,
bewildering both users and software developers.
Ensuring that software always sees a consistent state is the primary goal
of both reference implementations. While there are problems amenable to
relaxing the predictability of software execution [33], we focus on creating a
general-purpose mechanism that software can use in ad-hoc ways. We offer
two systems, both powerful enough to reinforce the abstraction of a per-
fect processor (in spite of processor bugs and malicious circuits) and flexible
enough to expose the opportunity for software to make its own reliability
decisions.
2.5 Forward progress
For our purposes, forward progress is when software executes instructions af-
ter (program flow wise) the instruction that the detector associates with the
imperfection activation. Executing instructions after the activating instruc-
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tion is an indicator of forward progress because the detectors catch potential
problems while the activating instruction (and its potentially contaminated
state updates) is in-flight; therefore, any instruction that does manage to
commit its state updates has been cleared by the detectors. Committing
instructions after the activating instruction implies that the activating in-
struction has already been committed, meaning that the state of software
has move forward.
Software is only be able to move forward if the recovery mechanism cor-
rectly moves the state of software past the imperfection. Thus, the sole goal
of BlueChip is to create forward progress.
2.6 Recovery
Formally, recovery is when the processor avoids failure in the presence of
processor errors. We define recovery as the ability of software to make forward
progress, while maintaining a consistent state. In the two reference designs,
we say that recovery is successful if given a starting state and some stream of
instructions from software, the ending state of that the recovery mechanism
produces and the ending state that a perfect processor would produce are
equivalent.
Note that the ending states may not be identical. For example, it is still
considered a successful recovery if the timer register differs. Since it is not a
design goal to hide the side effects of recovery from software (although we do
build mechanisms to protect the recovery firmware from modification by soft-
ware), there is no need to update these types of implementation/environment-
dependent state registers. In the case of the timer register, the ISA does not
have a notion of time, so there is no expectation by software that an add




3.1 Recovering from processor errors
Recovery mechanisms allow the system to continue execution, in a consis-
tent state, in the event of a fault detection. A general way of classifying
a fault recovery mechanism is as either forward error recovery or backward
error recovery. In forward error recovery, faults are corrected as part of the
detection process. In backward error recovery, the state of the system must
be restored to a consistent state before execution can resume.
Forward error recovery strategies, by their nature, require some form of
duplication. Duplication can come in the form of additional hardware like
DIVA, and its addition of a simple core, or in the form of additional software,
as in SWIFT-R [34], with three versions of each program and a voter. While
these and other forward error recovery techniques save time in the faulty
case by not requiring rollback and re-execution, they require a significant
slowdown in the bug free case and possibly large hardware area overheads.
For the hardware bug fault model, the fault free cases is the common case.
For processor faults, current backward error recovery proposals rely on
some level of checkpointing and rollback to ensure a consistent system state.
Unlike forward error recovery, the overhead due to recovery can be significant
due to state rollback and re-execution. Checkpointing also consumes CPU
cycles in the fault free case by monitoring state changes and creating logs.
SafetyNet [35] and CASPAR [36] are hardware implemented memory check-
pointing and recovery mechanisms that support long-latency fault detection.
Besides slowing the system down, these approaches add to the processor’s
complexity, increasing the time required for verification. Relax [37] on the
other hand, implements checkpointing and recovery using a their custom Re-
lax LLVM compiler. The Relax compiler removes any additional hardware
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burden. The downside of Relax is that it only works for applications that
can tolerate imperfect results and requires increased awareness and effort on
the part of programmers.
Recovery proposals consist of techniques the rely on having system-wide
checkpointing and rollback mechanisms [35, 36, 38, 39] and techniques based
on intelligent recompilation of programs [40]. Checkpoint and rollback sup-
port adds a great deal of complexity to the system, delaying tape-out if
hardware implemented, and causing significant run time overhead if software
implemented. Checkpointing and recovery schemes also require awareness
on the part of software to take advantage of the bug detectors. Intelligent
recompilation schemes have a low run time overhead, but will not work for
the large percentage of bugs not already patchable by software. Plus, intel-
ligent recompilation also requires significant software support for dynamic
recompilation and a complex central processor that is bug free.
Erratacator’s fault recovery mechanism, while being classified as a back-
ward error recovery mechanism, removes much of the overhead endemic to
this class recovery by reusing the processor’s own built-in checkpointing and
recovery mechanism–the pipeline. Because Erratacator does not add any
bubbles to the processor’s pipeline, there is also none of the run time over-
head associated with checkpointing systems.
Software implemented fault tolerance (SWIFT) [41] combines two identical
versions of the same program together in the same instruction stream. This
technique not only increases the fault free run time of programs, but due
to large detection latencies, requires a rollback mechanism for recovery. An-
other software-only fault detection technique is MASK [34]. In MASK, the
compiler generates invariants about the data values of a program, adding run
time checks to ensure those invariants are upheld. Current implementations
of MASK are limited to looking for known zero values, which, while low over-
head, severely limits its ability to detect faults. A last software-only detection
technique, triple redundancy using multiplication protection (TRUMP) [34],
effectively generates a second version of each program by multiplying each
data value by a constant, called AN-encoding. TRUMP has reduced run time
overhead compared to SWIFT and improved fault detection over MASK, but
without hardware support for increased register bit widths, AN-coding fails
with large data values due to overflow. Also TRUMP, by its data-driven
nature, is limited to a subset of an ISA’s instructions.
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3.2 Processor bug detectors
One hybrid approach for detecting processor faults proposes comparing the
possible behaviors of a program with the actual behavior. Argus [38] detects
faults by looking for divergence in the control flow, data flow, execution, and
memory of a program compared to the all possible static flows and expected
results. The techniques Argus uses for verifying execution are similar based
on those discussed by Sellers et al. [42]. Much like DIVA, these compared
execution-based techniques are complex, requiring additional hardware area,
and increase verification effort, both of which Erratacator does not.
Another hybrid processor fault detection approach is to periodically pause
the processor and check for an inconsistent state. This is the central tech-
nique employed by SWAT [8], ACE [43], and the proposal of Shyam et al. [44].
These techniques impose a large run time overhead in the bug free case and,
due to the latency of software-level detection, require a checkpointing and
rollback mechanism for recovery. These techniques also require complex hard-
ware to support accurate detection of faults not visible to software. Even with
hardware support, these techniques are likely to miss bug activations that
happen below the micro-architectural level, since there hardware detectors
are static and only look at signals at that level.
3.3 Hardware attacks
The available examples of attacks on hardware are currently limited to what
academia produces as those in industry speak only aloofly about attacks they
have seen, never coming close to describing the attack’s behavior, or even the
attacker’s motives. Even in academia there exists a limited pool of example
attacks, mostly coming from work by King et al. [4] and Hicks et al. [45].
Hadvzic et al. were the first to look at what hardware attacks would
look like and what they could do [46]. They specifically targeted FPGAs,
adding malicious logic to the FPGA’s configuration file that would short-
circuit wires, driving logic high values, in an attempt to increase the device’s
current draw, causing the destruction of the device through overheating.
They also proposed both a change to the FPGA architecture and a configu-
ration analysis tool that would defend against the proposed attacks.
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As a part of their paper describing their malicious circuit fingerprinting
approach, Agrawal et al. describe three attacks to RSA hardware [12]. One
attack uses a built-in counter which after a pre-described number of clock
cycles, shuts down the RSA hardware. The other two attacks use a com-
parison based trigger which, when activated, contaminates the results of the
RSA hardware. The attacks show how small of a footprint targeted attacks
on hardware can have in terms of circuit area, power, and the amount of
coding effort required to weaken hardware.
The Illinois Malicious Processor (IMP) by King et al. [4] is the first work
to propose the idea of malicious hardware being used as a support mecha-
nism by attack software, usurping software-level security primitives. These
intentional hardware security vulnerabilities, inserted during design time,
are termed footholds. Being small in terms of number of lines of code and
effect on the rest of the design, footholds are shown to be difficult to de-
tect using conventional means or side channel analysis. IMP contains two
attacks, unauthorized memory access, where user processes can access re-
stricted memory addresses and shadow mode, where the the processor ex-
ecutes in a special, hidden, mode. Three malicious software services that
leverage the inserted footholds, privilege escalation, a backdoor into the lo-
gin process, and a password stealer are constructed. In follow-on work, Hicks
et al. [45] reimplemented the attacks and verified that the attacked hardware
passed SPARCv8 certification tests.
Jin et al. developed eight attacks of the staged military encryption system
codenamed Alpha [47]. The attacks corrupted four different units and three
of the data paths of the encryption system, exposing the vulnerability of
current hardware to malicious insertions. The eight attacks ranged in area
overhead from less than 1% to almost 7% while still managing to pass func-
tional verification tests. The results re-enforced the notion of small, buried,
but powerfully attacks from King et al.’s previous work.
3.4 Defenses to hardware attacks
This section covers research on detecting and defending against malicious
hardware during design time, possibly with a run time component.
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3.4.1 Design time
In Moats and Drawbridges [16], Huffmire et al. propose an FPGA isolation
primitive along with a cooperating inter-module communication philosophy
in an attempt to bring the properties that a memory management unit brings
to software processes to distinct hardware units. The isolation primitive re-
quires a perimeter of unused logic elements, moats, around each independent
design unit. The inter-module communication philosophy, drawbridges, re-
quires the use of predefined, statically verifiable, pathways for communicating
between distinct hardware units. While Moats and Drawbridges does allow
distinct hardware units to have data integrity and confidentiality, moats can
dramatically increase area of a design with many units that use most of a
FPGA’s logic resources. More importantly, moats and drawbridges do not
increase trust in any individual unit or in the design as a whole.
In research targeted at the post manufacturing stage, but directly applica-
ble to the design stage, Agrawal et al. [12] propose a signal processing-based
technique for detect additional circuits through side-channel power analysis.
This approach faces two key challenges. First, it assumes that the defender
has a reference copy of the design without a trojan circuit, an assumption
that breaks if there is no pre-existing unit. Second, the experimental results
are from simulations on small (1000 gate) circuits. Thus, it is unclear how
well the proposed technique will work in practice, on large circuits, such as
microprocessors.
Formal methods such as symbolic execution [48, 49], model checking [50,
51, 52], and information flow [53, 54] have been applied to software systems
for better test coverage and improved security analysis. These diverse ap-
proaches can be viewed as alternatives to UCI, and may provide promising
extensions for UCI to detect malicious hardware if correct abstractions can
be developed.
3.4.2 Run time
TrustNet and DataWatch [55] work in-conjunction at run time, ensuring that
an untrusted hardware unit does not generate more or less output data than
it is supposed to, given the inputs it sees. This approach, based on the
DIVA architecture [10], consists of hardware monitors architected as a series
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of triangles where the inputs and outputs of each untrusted hardware unit
are monitored by the other two units of the monitor triangle. The units
of a given monitor triangle are consecutive, hence cooperating units in the
processor’s natural pipeline. Given an input, the monitor determines what
the appropriate amount of output is, signaling an error if too little (denial-of-
service) or too much (information leakage) data is produced. This approach
works well in an environment where a processor is outsourced and the system
integrator has enough knowledge and ability to create and insert the monitor
triangles. It is also unclear how this approach handles mutated data.
Fault-tolerance techniques [56, 57] may be effective against malicious ICs.
In the Byzantine Generals problem [56], Lamport, et al. prove that 3m+1
ICs are be needed to cope with m malicious ICs. Although this technique
can be applied in theory, in practice this amount of redundancy may be too
expensive because of cost, power consumption, and board real estate. Fur-
thermore, only 59 foundries worldwide can process state-of-the-art 300mm
wafers [58], so one must choose manufacturing locations carefully to achieve
the diversity needed to cope with malicious ICs.
In some respects, the BlueChip system resembles previous work on hard-
ware extensibility, where designers use various forms of software to extend
and change the way deployed hardware works. Some examples of this type
of hardware extensibility include patchable microcode [59], firmware-based
TLB control in Itanium processors [60], Transmeta code morphing software
[61], and Alpha PAL code [62]. Our design uses some of the same hardware
mechanisms used in these systems, but for coping with malicious hardware
rather than design bugs.
3.4.3 Supply chain
Analog side effects can be used to identify individual chips. Process variations
cause each chip to behave slightly different, and Gassend, et al. use this fact
to create physically random functions (PUFs) that can be used to identify
individual chips uniquely [11]. Chip identification ensures that chips are not
swapped in transit, but chip identification can be avoided by inserting the
malicious circuits higher up in the supply pipeline.
The possibility of using power analysis to identify malicious circuits was
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considered in [12]. However, power analysis began as an attack technique [63].
Hence there is a large body of work to preventing power analysis, especially
using dual-rail and constant power draw circuits [13, 14]. For the designer of
a Trojan circuit, such countermeasures are especially feasible; the area over-
heads only apply to the small Trojan circuit, and not to the entire processor.
One can obtain the layout of an IC and determine if it matches the spec-
ification. IC reverse engineering can re-create complete circuit diagrams of
manufactured ICs [15]; the defender can inspect their circuits to verify them.
Unfortunately, such reverse engineering is time consuming, destructive, and
expensive. It may take up to a week and $250,000 to reverse engineer a single
chip [15].
3.5 Formal analysis of hardware
Hardware, due to its limited resources and cycle-based behavior is generally
more amenable to formal analysis than software. The current focus of the
majority of research on formal methods, as applied to hardware, centers on
verifying that the hardware faithfully implements some specification (verifi-
cation).
Model checking is the process of verifying that the behavior of a hardware
design matches properties specified using temporal logic formulas [64, 65].
The drawback of model checking is computational complexity through state
space explosion [66]. Even with advances in Boolean satisfiability solving
(SAT) [67] and symbolic representation [68], the most advanced tools are
unable to completely tame the state space explosion problem enough to han-
dle large sequential designs [69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76]. Also, writing a
complete set of properties that precisely verify every aspect of the hardware
design is of the same complexity as describing it in using hardware descrip-





Processors are not perfect—they have bugs. Modern processors are as com-
plex as modern operating systems, consisting of millions of lines of code [1],
yielding chips with billions of transistors [2]. Since completely verifying pro-
cessors of such complexity is intractable, verification tools leave hundreds of
bugs unexposed in production hardware. For example, the errata document
for Intel’s Core 2 Duo processor family [3] contains information on 129 known
bugs. Averaged over the production life of the processor family, that is more
than 2.5 bugs per month. Yet despite these imperfections, we design, debug,
and deploy software systems trusting that processors are bug free.
Some processor bugs force designers to change the way they implement
features. For example, GDB designers use breakpoints rather than instruc-
tion overwriting to interpose on the execution of a thread for their “fast
tracepoint” implementation. This lower performance design comes from the
undefined system behavior resulting from processor bugs [5].
Processor bugs can also cause security vulnerabilities. For example, the
MIPS R4000 processor has a bug that enables user-mode code to control the
location of the exception vector, giving attackers the ability to run user-mode
software at the processor’s supervisor level [6]. In addition, the designers of
Google’s NativeClient [7], which is browser-based sandbox for native x86
code, argue that their reduced attack surface is a result of limiting the in-
structions that NativeClient modules can execute, thus avoiding processor
bugs. The designers of NativeClient contrast their design to Xax [77], which
the NativeClient authors claim has security vulnerabilities caused by proces-
sor bugs.
One approach to patching processor bugs is to add redundant execution
in the hopes that at least one of the executions will be bug free. Diva [10]
is a redundant execution-based approach to detecting and recovering from
processor bugs (among other processor faults) that adds redundancy to the
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hardware layer in the form of a second processor from a previous generation.
Presumably, the previous generation processor is less buggy, which allows
Diva to mark any execution that diverges from the previous generation pro-
cessor’s execution as bug contaminated. Presumably, the previous generation
processor is also slower, as the previous generation processor must sign-off on
the execution results of the current generation processor before Diva commits
the results. This limits software to the execution speed of the older, slower
processor; imposing run time penalties even when no bug activations occur.
Another disadvantage of Diva is the open question of handling instructions
and other features present in the current generation processor not present
in the previous generation processor. But, the most impactful drawback of
Diva is the doubling of hardware area and added complexity of connecting
the two processors together, which serves to increase the risk of processor
bugs.
We propose combining the low latency of hardware-based processor bug de-
tection with the dynamic power of software-based recovery to form a practical
processor bug detection and recovery platform we call Erratacator. Separat-
ing Erratacator from previous proposals is the insight that processors have
sufficient innate functionality both to maintain a consistent state in the face
of bug activations and to allow software to make forward progress in the pres-
ence of processor bugs. Erratacator maintains a consistent state by connect-
ing low latency processor bug detectors [9] to the processor’s pipeline flush
controller. This allows the processor to simply flush any contaminated state,
obviating any need for the heavyweight checkpointing and rollback mecha-
nisms required by software-based bug patching approaches. To eliminate the
complex and hardware intensive recovery requirements of hardware-based
processor bug patching approaches, Erratacator employs flexible, formally
verified, software-level, recovery routines that recode instruction streams in
an effort to route execution around processor bugs. The insight driving this
technique is that processors contain large amounts of redundant functionality
and that the vast majority of a processor’s functionality is bug free.
By repurposing processor functionality, Erratacator reinforces the abstrac-
tion of a perfect processor without placing any burden upon software develop-
ers and with trivial increases in hardware area and complexity for processor
vendors. If software developers want to explore the trade-off between per-
formance and reliability, Erratacator exposes an instruction set architecture
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(ISA) extension that software to manage which bug detectors are active. In
the same vein, Erratacator enables processor vendors to explore the trade-off
between design time verification and run time overhead, possibly parallelizing
tapeout and the final, time inefficient [78], stages of debugging.
Experiments with Erratacator, using publicly documented bugs [79, 80,
81], show that Erratacator can detect and recover from a wide range of bugs.
The hardware area overhead imposed by Erratacator’s bug detectors is less
than 1% and the software run time overhead is less than 12% as long as bug
detections occur separated by 8000, or more, instructions. Interesting results
include that Erratacator can recover from most, but not every processor bug
and that providing practical protection in the presence of many processor
bugs requires software intervention.
In summary, the contributions of this reference implementation are:
• We design, implement, and evaluate a complete and practical system
that detects and recovers from real processor bugs.
• We use the processor pipeline’s flush mechanism to eliminate the heavy-
weight checkpointing and rollback mechanisms required by previous
proposals.
• Instead of eliminating functionality or requiring additional processors,
we use the dynamic power of software and the redundant, bug free
functionality inherent to processors as the recovery mechanism.
• We use formal verification to prove that the architecture models em-
ployed by Erratacator firmware (i.e., some instructions removed from
the ISA) and the model described by the processor’s ISA are equivalent.
• We are the first to implement a recent processor bug detection proposal,
expose scaling issues, and propose and implement mechanisms that
allow better scaling.
4.1 Erratacator overview
Processor bug activations are rare, but pervasively powerful. An ideal patch-
ing solution transparently reinforces the abstraction of a perfect processor
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while imposing no run time overhead in the common case of no bug activa-
tions. Any approach to patching processor bugs must have (1) the ability
to detect bugs and (2) a recovery mechanism that allows for safe and cor-
rect software execution post-bug activation. Additionally, the detection and
recovery mechanisms must work together to ensure that the transition from
detection to recovery removes all state contaminated due to the bug activa-
tion.
In light of these goals, this section presents the design principles and as-
sumptions behind Erratacator, a hybrid platform for detecting and recovering
from processor bugs.
4.1.1 Design principles
Three key principles guide the design:
1. Minimize recovery and bug detection complexity. For Erratacator to
be practical and not burden hardware designers, we must avoid adding
complex hardware structures by repurposing existing mechanisms.
2. Implement correct recovery firmware. For Erratacator to be practical
and not burden software designers, we must have high assurance that
the recovery firmware pushes software state forward correctly, even
when running on buggy hardware.
3. Maintain current ISA abstractions. For software running on Errata-
cator, including hypervisors and operating systems, Erratacator must
provide the illusion of executing on a perfect processor.
4.1.2 The Erratacator approach
Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the components that comprise Errataca-
tor and their responsibilities. Erratacator consists of hardware-implemented
processor bug detectors and firmware-level processor bug avoidance routines.
Note the detectors only interact with the processor through a single wire
to the exception logic, not adding to the complexity of the processor. Also














Figure 4.1: Flow of detection and recovery in Erratacator: 1) Software executes
normally on the processor while the bug detectors check the processor’s state for
bug signature matches 2) A bug signature match causes the bug detectors to
signal the processor for an exception 3) The exception causes any bug
contaminated state to be flushed and control passes to the recovery firmware 4)
The recovery firmware backs-up the ISA-level state of the processor, then fetches,
decodes, recodes, and executes instruction streams from the software layer 1)
Eventually the recovery firmware loads the updated ISA-level state of the software
layer back into the processor from the simulator and passes control back to the
software layer.
The hardware portion of Erratacator’s recovery repurposes the proces-
sor’s built-in exception handling logic as a checkpointing and rollback mech-
anism, avoiding the complex and heavy-weight hardware structures required
by other proposals [35]. A key observation is that processor exception han-
dling mechanism already provides a version of checkpointing and rollback,
just with a checkpoint window spanning from the fetch stage to right before
the instruction’s changes are committed to the ISA-level state (e.g., three
stages on the traditional MIPS 5-stage processor). When a bug detection
exception occurs, the processor flushes in-flight state and passes control to
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a firmware-implemented exception handler, ensuring that the architecturally
visible processor state remains consistent. Because the checkpoint window is
only a few cycles, it requires processor bug detection latencies equally small
to ensure a consistent software state.
To meet such latency demands, Erratacator’s bug detectors reside in hard-
ware, constantly monitoring the processor’s hardware-level state for bug acti-
vations, as show in Figure 4.1. Erratacator’s detectors do this by comparing
the current processor state values (i.e., the value of all flip-flops that im-
plement the processor) to those in a dynamically definable signature. If no
bug signatures match the current state of the processor, execution continues.
When a signature does match, the detection hardware triggers an exception,
which the processor handles in a similar fashion to any other exception.
The processor delivers the bug detection exception to Erratacator’s re-
covery firmware. The recovery firmware first backs-up the processor’s state,
allowing for processing of recursive bug detection exceptions. Then the re-
covery firmware loads and recodes a series of software layer instructions, in
a attempt to advance correctly software state by avoiding re-triggering the
bug. When done, Erratacator’s recovery firmware updates the state of the
processor with the software’s simulated state and passes control back to the
software layer.
One key aspect of the recovery firmware is that it simulates instructions us-
ing a different sequence of instructions to avoid re-triggering the bug—think
of it as trying to achieve the same ISA-level effect as the original instruc-
tion stream, but restricting the set of available instructions. For example,
Erratacator simulates multiply instructions using shifts and adds. To ensure
correctness of the recoding, we use formal methods to prove equivalence be-
tween the net effect on ISA-level state of the original instruction stream and
the recoded instruction stream. Formal verification does not ensure ensure
that the ISA used for recovery is as expressive as the original ISA, so recov-
ery is not always possible. In such cases, the flexibility of firmware allows for
patches to the recovery routines.
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4.1.3 Assumptions
For Erratacator to work, we make three assumptions. First, the processor is
in a state that can be interrupted by a bug detection exception. This assump-
tion holds for all of the supervisor-mode and user-mode software that runs
on the selected processor, even with interrupts disabled. As demonstrated in
Section 4.5, processor bugs can violate this assumption even if software does
not, preventing complete recovery.
The second assumption is that the processor’s pipeline flushes all bug-
contaminated state upon receiving an Erratacator exception. Because Er-
ratacator repurposes the processor’s pipeline as a checkpointing and rollback
mechanism, it relies on proper operation of the flush mechanism to maintain
a consistent state in the face of processor bug activations. Processor bugs
that violate this assumption, as shown in Section 4.5, can prolong recovery
or even make it impossible.
The third assumption is that the recovery firmware’s entry and exit rou-
tines execute without triggering a processor bug. To allow for handling of
recursive bug detections, the first and last action the recovery firmware per-
forms is backing-up to and restoring from memory the state overwritten by
the processor when it handles an exception (e.g., the Status Register). If
the recovery firmware’s entry or exit routines trigger a processor bug, it is
possible the processor will live lock, perpetually attempting to recode the
same instruction sequence. However, the entry and exit routines are 14 in-
structions each and guaranteeing that they run to completion means that
recursive Erratacator exceptions are tolerable at any time.
4.2 Recovery firmware
Erratacator firmware is responsible for helping software safely execute sec-
tions of code that trigger processor bugs. Erratacator’s recovery firmware
pushes software state forward through the use of bug avoidance routines
which recode the software’s instruction streams using a different set of in-
structions, i.e., a sub-ISA. By changing the set of available instructions, the
firmware mutates the original instruction stream to one that has the same
ending ISA-level state, but which takes a different path to get there. This























Figure 4.2: 1) Software executing normally on the processor 2) When a bug
detection occurs, control passes to the recovery firmware which backs-up the
software’s state and exception registers in pre-defined simulator data structures
3) The recovery firmware fetch, decodes, recodes, and 4) executes several
instructions from the software level 5) Once past the bug, the recovery firmware
loads the processor with the software state in the simulator and passes control
back to the software level 6) Software resumes normal execution
Figure 4.2 provides an overview of how the recovery process works to push
software execution forward, around processor bugs by recoding the original
instruction stream and executing the recode stream on the processor. Errat-
acator’s recovery firmware consists of entry and exit routines, routines that
fetch and decode instructions from software, and recoding routines.
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4.2.1 Hardware/firmware interface
One of Erratacator’s goals is to not increase the complexity of the processor,
some added complexity is required to support software recovery. It is im-
portant for efficient recovery that the firmware know the source of the bug
detection. This requires the addition of a ISA-level register that the firmware
can read to direct recoding. Another issue is that bug detections can occur
even in software that is executing with interrupts disabled. This means that
invoking the firmware could overwrite special purpose registers not backed-up
by software. To solve this issue, Erratacator adds ghost versions of all excep-
tion registers and creates an additional ghost register to be used as a tem-
porary holding place for the recovery firmware’s entry routine—we usually
put software’s stack pointer there. Without this extended interface between
hardware and the firmware it would be impossible to invoke the recovery
firmware without losing some crucial data.
Another addition to the hardware/firmware interface is a set of registers
that allow for fine-grained control of the general purpose bug detection fab-
ric. These registers include the system mask, system signature, and a bug
enable register that controls which bug detectors can fire exceptions. This
is essential for allowing Erratacator to keep high layers of the system pro-
tected from newly discovered bugs and allows for a more nuanced control
of where Erratacator is executing in the protection vs performance tradeoff
space. These bug detector control registers also make it possible for software
to control which bug detectors are active and when (e.g., operating system
vitalized signatures and masks) as discussed later in this section.
4.2.2 Firmware/software interface
When the processor issues an bug detection exception, Erratacator’s recovery
firmware is tasked with pushing the state of the software layer forward, so
that it can continue executing on its own, past the bug activating code. After
the recovery firmware saves the current state of the software layer (as stored
in the processor), initializes itself, and determines what the bug is, it is ready
to assist the software layer. This requires that the firmware reach into the
address space of the software layer to read instructions and data values. The
recovery firmware does this by manually walking the TLBs (if the MMU was
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enabled at the time of detection) and fetching the required value straight
from memory.
Erratacator firmware then simulates the interrupted software using a dif-
ferent set of instructions to avoid re-exercising the buggy processor logic.
Although our simulation is general purpose and our technique of simulating
instructions using a different set of instructions enables Erratacator to avoid
a wide range of bugs, our hardware/firmware interface, by exposing which
bug caused the Erratacator exception allows for custom recovery routines.
The custom recovery routines are more efficient that our general purpose
simulator, but the simulator is at least a reliable backstop.
4.2.3 Handling recursive bug detections
Recovery in Erratacator is a trial and error process. Because an attempt at
recovery may activate a bug itself, Erratacator is designed to handle recur-
sive bug detections—outside of the entry and exit sequences. This allows the
recovery firmware to keep changing the sub-ISA used to recode the original
instruction stream, increasing the odds of recovery. The ability to handle
recursive bug detections also allows recovery firmware designers to sacrifice
likelihood of recovery in favor of lower average run time overheads; since they
can also try the safer recovery method if the faster method fails. Experimen-
tal results in Section 4.5 highlight the difference in speed of two different
recovery approaches.
The first obstacle to handling recursive bug detections is protecting the
ISA-level state that taking and exception atomically updates. Erratacator
handles this by creating a special stack for all atomically updated registers.
The recovery firmware stores a pointer to the most recent frame at a known
address in it memory space. Since the frames are all the same size, traversing
between the frames of different recovery firmware invocations it trivial. All
atomically updated registers and the pointer are saved/updated in the entry
routine and the most recent frame is unloaded into their associated registers
in the processor and the pointer decremented in the exit routine.
The second obstacle is that the recovery firmware cannot simulate itself.
This creates problems when bug detections occur while the recovery firmware
is fetching or decoding instructions from software, i.e., not actually recod-
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ing or executing the recoded instruction stream. In these cases, which the
recovery firmware knows by inspecting the address associated with the bug
detection, recovery will just restart in hopes that the act of taking the ex-
ception was enough of a disturbance to avoid the bug. To avoid live locks
due to this restriction, we avoided complex control paths in the fetch and
decode code to make its execution pattern very regular. An inspection of the
documentation of the errata-like bugs from our processor revealed that none
threatened the fetch or decode parts of the recovery firmware.
If the recovery firmware is recoding or executing the recoded instruction
stream, it will restart the simulation process, but with a different recoding
algorithm.
4.2.4 Software managed reliability
Results from experiments (Section 4.5), where Erratacator was tasked with
monitoring an increasing number of bugs, expose the problem of false bug
detections. Bug detector resources are limited (Section 4.3), therefore, when
Erratacator needs to monitor for activations of multiple bugs, there is a
chance that the bug signatures will involved the same state values. To pre-
vent contamination due to missed bug activations, Erratacator must combine
competing bug signatures in a pessimistic way, creating the potential for false
positives.
Dynamically enabling and disabling bug detectors can reduce false detec-
tions while maintaining a consistent ISA-level state. Since bug signatures
in Erratacator are dynamically reconfigurable, both hardware and software
have an opportunity to manage which bugs detectors are active. In the case
of software, Erratacator extends the processor’s interface with software, al-
lowing software to manage its own reliability and run time overheads by con-
trolling which processor bugs it’s exposed to and when. Experimental results




This section covers our formal verification effort on the recovery firmware.
Our goal is to prove that the recoding routines used to route software ex-
ecution around processor bugs are equivalent to the instructions that they
replace. Note that we assume that the firmware’s entry and exit routines are
correct and that the firmware correctly fetches instructions from the software
stack. We also assume the firmware starts in a consistent ISA-level state.
Because Erratacator firmware simulates instructions without using the in-
struction it is simulating, the recovery firmware is more complex than a tra-
ditional instruction-by-instruction simulator. For example, we simulate ADD
instructions using a series of bit-wise Boolean operations, shifts, and com-
parisons to check for carry and overflow conditions. These bit-manipulation
operations are difficult to reason about manually, which motivates our use of
formal methods to prove the correctness of our implementation.
The code that we prove falls into three categories. First, we prove correct
helper functions that we compose together to simulate instructions. These
functions include sign extend, zero extend, and overflow and carry logic for
arithmetic operations. Second, we prove correct alternative implementations
of instructions that trigger processor bugs. These instructions include DI-
VIDE, MULTIPLY, ADD, and SUBTRACT. Here we prove that using a
set of completely different instructions is equivalent, at the ISA-level, to the
bug inducing instruction. Third, we specify invariants on our processor state
structures to specify and prove correct our instruction decode logic. All of
our source code, with our specifications, can be found on our web site [82].
To verify our implementation, we used VCC [83]. VCC enables sound
verification of functional properties of low-level C code. It provides ways
to define annotations of C code describing function contract specification.
Given the contracts, VCC performs a static analysis, in which each function
is verified in isolation, where function calls are interpreted by in-lining their
contract specifications. To create the contracts for each instruction’s function
within the simulator, we used the description from the OR1200’s instruction
set specification. The instruction set specification provides precise ISA state
changes given an instruction and the current ISA-level state. Our code con-
tracts look very similar, with assertions on function inputs acting as checks
on the starting ISA-level state and assertions that check the final ISA-level
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static void calc divu(u32 divisor, u32 dividend, u32 ∗quo out, u32 ∗rem out)
{
u32 idx, quotient, reminder;
// i32 rem; // BUG HERE
i64 rem; // GOOD
u64 rq = dividend;
rq <<= 1;
for(idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++)
{
rem = (i64) ((rq >> 32) & 0xffffffff);
rem = rem − divisor; // BUG expressed here
if(rem < 0) {
rq <<= 1;
} else {







Listing 4.1: Divide bug 1
state for the expected update. Therefore, we consider verification complete if
for every instruction in the ISA, the input and output state of the simulator
matches the states mandated by the instruction set specification.
Our verification efforts, which took place after all conventional software
tests were passed, revealed subtle bugs in our sign extend helper function
(discussed later) and our divide instruction implementation that were caused
by implicit, yet incorrect, assumptions that we made when writing the sim-
ulator (mostly to do with signed vs unsigned numbers).
Formal verification exposed two bugs in our divide recoding function,
calc divu. The first one, shown in Listing 4.1, is caused by representing the
difference between the divisor and the most significant bit of the dividend
using a signed 32 bit integer (the variable named “rem” in the implementa-
tion). If the dividend is larger than 231, the calculated difference stored in
“rem” is positive, while the correct difference is negative. So, the function
wrongly increments the quotient: instead of just shifting left. For example,
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static void calc divu(u32 divisor, u32 dividend, u32 ∗quo out, u32 ∗rem out)
{
u32 idx, quotient, reminder;
// u32 rem; // BUG HERE
i64 rem; // GOOD
u64 rq = dividend;
rq <<= 1; // BUG partially activated
for(idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++)
{
rem = (i64) ((rq >> 32) & 0xffffffff); // BUG fully activated





Listing 4.2: Divide bug 2
the procedure will not correctly compute the quotient and the reminder of
1/((231) + 1).
The second bug—which we created while trying to fix the first bug—shown
in Listing 4.2, is due to trying to fit the reminder in 31 bits, because we used
a signed integer. Because of the initial left shift and 32 left shifts in the loop,
the reminder is stored in upper 31 bits of the register pair reminder-quotient,
denoted “rq” in the listing. That the reminder is in the upper 31 bits is also
confirmed when shifting right by 33 when obtaining the final value of the
reminder. This bug comes up when the divisor is greater than the dividend,
and the dividend is greater than (231) − 1. For example, the procedure will
return the reminder 0 instead of 231 when computing 231/((231) + 1).
Interestingly, these division bugs are reminiscent of a processor bug that
has eluded several attempts at patching by the OR1200 community [80] (see
Section 4.4). They both are related to the same signed vs unsigned number
representation issues.
Aside from verifying the functional equivalence of our recoding routines,
we verify parts of the decode logic responsible for splitting instructions into
meaningful parts, e.g., opcode, ALU operation, and immediate. The diffi-
culty is how to split an instruction depends on what the instruction is and
even parts with the same label, e.g., immediate, are different sizes for differ-
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struct control {
u32 opcode; (invariant \this−>opcode
== (\this−>inst >> 26) & 0x3f))
u32 alu op; (invariant \this−>alu op < (1<<10))
... };
Listing 4.3: Instruction splitting assertions
static void maci(struct CPU ∗cpu, struct control ∗cont)
{
m = cpu get mac(cpu);
a = cpu get gpr(cpu, cont−>rA);
// imm = sign extend(cont−>I, 10); // BUG
imm = sign extend(cont−>I, 15); // GOOD
calc mul(a, imm, &r);
m += tmp;
cpu set mac(cpu, m);
}
Listing 4.4: Incorrect immediate size due to copy-and-paste bug
ent instructions.
To prevent errors in splitting instructions we first consult the instruction
set specification to determine the names and sizes of all possible pieces of an
instruction. We then add this information, in the form of invariants, to the
matching structures in our simulator. Listing 4.3 shows an example of how
we assert the size of instruction pieces in our simulator.
There is still a problem of different sized instruction pieces with the same
label. For example, the immediate piece of an instruction can be 11-bits or
16-bits wide. We need a way to prove that instructions expecting a 16-bit
immediate get one, while instructions expecting an 11-bit immediate get one.
Listing 4.4 shows a copy-and-paste error where we used a 16-bit immediate
as an 11-bit immediate. To catch these types of bugs, we add preconditions
to every simulator function that check for incorrectly sized inputs from the
decode stage. Listing 4.5 shows the preconditions added to the sign extend
function that caught the mis-sized immediate.
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static i32 sign extend(u32 value, u32 sign bit)
(requires sign bit < 31)
(requires value < (1<<(sign bit+1)))
(ensures (to u32(\result) & maxNbit32(sign bit+1)) ==
(value & maxNbit32(sign bit+1)) )
(ensures !bit set(value, sign bit) ==> \result >= 0)
(ensures !bit set(value, sign bit) ==> (to u32(\result) == value))
(ensures !bit set(value, sign bit) ==> ( \result == to i32(value)))
(ensures bit set(value, sign bit) ==> \result < 0)
(ensures bit set(value, sign bit) ==>
((to u32(\result) & maxNbit32(sign bit+1)) == value))
...
Listing 4.5: sign extend preconditions
4.2.6 Approach weaknesses
Complete recovery is not always possible, even if all the assumptions in Sec-
tion 4.1 hold. Generally, if there is insufficient bug-free redundancy available
or the bug avoidance routines do a poor job at exploiting bug-free redun-
dancy, recovery will fail. One concrete example for the OR1200 (see Sec-
tion 4.4) is a bug involving a write or read from the byte-bus. As its name
implies, the byte-bus is an 8-bit wide peripheral bus that can only be ac-
cessed at the byte level. If there is a flaw in the processor involving byte-bus
accesses, there is no way for Erratacator firmware to recode execution around
the bug.
Possible approaches to handling this type of failure includes simply up-
dating the recovery firmware or even extending the ISA further to allow
Erratacator to communicate cases of incomplete recovery to the software
level. Another option is for processor designers to ensure that functionality
that has the least redundancy is verified the most.
4.3 Detecting processor bug activations
Bug detectors are responsible for alerting the recovery mechanism to pro-
cessor bug activations. The detection latency of a bug detector is the time
difference between when the bug produces a fault and when the detector
detects the error caused by the fault. The larger the detection latency, the
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more system state is corrupted by the activation of the bug.
Low-latency bug detection is the cornerstone of Erratacator. By detecting
a bug before the write-back stage (where instruction results commit to ISA
state), Erratacator can forgo the traditional heavyweight checkpointing and
rollback mechanisms and instead use the processor’s pipeline and flush oper-
ation to ensure the processor maintains a consistent state. This requires the
detection of all processor bugs in less than four cycles.
In designing detectors that operate at such low detection latencies, the
method used to describe bugs is key. The description method employed by
designers determines not only what bugs are detectable, but the number of
false activations, and the hardware area consumed by the detectors.
To balance these concerns, Erratacator adapts a previously proposed hard-
ware bug detection mechanism, created by Constantinides et al. [9]. Their
bug detection mechanism has shown that it can provide single cycle detec-
tion, with modest hardware requirements (10% area overhead), while being
able to detect the majority of the bugs in a processor. Section 4.3.1 provides
an overview of their bug detection algorithm. While we do not attempt to
evaluate or improve upon their bug detection approach, we do make subtle
changes worth documenting and provide the first implementation as a part
of our Erratacator platform. Section 4.3.2 provides details on the changes
required to the detection mechanism to allow the processor’s pipeline to serve
as the checkpointing mechanism.
4.3.1 Background
Figure 4.3 provides a high-level overview of the components and connections
involved in the bug detection mechanism proposed by Constantinides et al..
The basic steps involved are signal selection, hardware creation, bug signature
creation, and bug detection. In general, signatures are a string of bits that
match processor states, masks are values that Constantinides et al. use to
specify relevant value bits, and segments are units of four bits that they use
to build up an overall signature.
During design time, the processor designer selects a set of signals in the
circuit to monitor for bugs. Constantinides et al. advocate for selecting
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Figure 4.3: Architecture of the processor bug detectors proposed by
Constantinides et al..
overhead by reusing the pre-existing built-in self test hardware for bug check-
ing. Once the signals are selected, circuitry is automatically added to the
processor to support monitoring the selected signals’ run time values against
a system-wide bug signature. Circuitry is also added for storing multiple
bug masks which encode which portion of the system signature each bug is
sensitive to.
Signatures are representations of the current state of the system, i.e., the
concatenation of all values of signals that are flip-flop outputs. If we think of
hardware as a large dataflow graph, starting from any bug, we can traverse
the graph, stopping at flip-flops, and build the set of monitored signals that
control a bug’s activation. Thus, each bug has an associated signature which
specifies the values the monitored signals must take on to activate the bug.
Figure 4.4 shows a circuit that produces a buggy result and its associated
signature. By monitoring the current state of the system and comparing it
to each bug’s signature, the bug detector knows when a bug is activated.
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Figure 4.4: Shows the creation of bug signatures and masks by using signals
that are flip-flops outputs. Part a shows how the mask creates ’X’ (don’t care)
values by encoding which segments can possibly affect the bug. Part b shows how
’X’ values get added when multiple bug triggers are combined into a single
signature. Part c shows the resulting bug signature which is a combination of the
results of steps a and b.
with a bug’s activation. For instance, if there is no path connecting a sig-
nal ’A’ and a buggy output ’B’ in the dataflow graph representation of the
hardware, then we can say that ’B’ does not care what the value of ’A’ is.
This requires a third value possibility for each signature character–’X’ (Don’t
Care). For each signal marked with an ’X’ in a bug’s signature, the detector
can ignore the current value of the signal, because it does not contribute to
the bug’s activation. Figure 4.4(a) shows the addition of these types of ’X’
values to a bug’s signature.
It is also possible that multiple values of a monitored signal activate a
bug. This case also produces an ’X’ value for the conflicting bits, as shown in
Figure 4.4(b). While the resulting ’X’ value is the same as with the previous
case, this situation can produce false detections. False detections occur when
’X’ values accumulate inside a bug detection segment. The accumulated ’X’
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values express more states of the system than the actual set of states that
can activate the bug. False detections are not generally a problem with
the previous case, as those ’X’ values are not monitored in a bug detection
segment for that bug, where in the later case they are.
4.3.2 Erratacator modifications
The primary modification Erratacator makes to the bug detector is connect-
ing the bug detection signal to one of the processor’s interrupts. This forces
the processor to perform a pipeline flush in the event of a detected bug
activation. Not just any interrupt will suffice. The interrupt used by Errat-
acator needs to be the highest priority resumable interrupt in the system.
The interrupt can also never be disabled, which requires additional hardware
support to avoid losing state when handling Erratacator exceptions that oc-
cur when all interrupts would normally be disabled. To prevent state loss
in this situation, Erratacator adds detector-only copies of all exception reg-
isters and the stack register. This not only allows for the safe interruption
of previously uninterruptable blocks of code, but also allows for recursive
Erratacator exceptions.
It is also important that Erratacator exceptions do not spawn any other
exception themselves. The most notable cases are exceptions dealing with
the state of the memory hierarchy (e.g., a page fault). To support this, Er-
ratacator exceptions are only interruptable by other Erratacator exceptions.
To avoid locking the processor by having a page fault, etc., occur when the
firmware attempts to run, Erratacator firmware sits outside the traditional
memory hierarchy of the processor.
As a byproduct of using the processor’s interrupt mechanism, Erratacator
exceptions are associated with an instruction, whether they are caused by
an instruction or not 1. It is critical for recovery that Erratacator associates
the bug to an instruction that allows all contaminated state to be flushed
out of the pipeline. All issued instructions before the trapped instruction are
considered to have fully executed and have impacted the state of the system.
1As discussed in Section 4, many bugs are linked to a series of events, e.g., an exception
occurring on a page boundary, as opposed to being caused by a specific instruction. In this
case, Erratacator associates the bug detection with the instruction preceding the exception



































Figure 4.5: Structural comparison of the segment checking tree (top) and its
more compact and area efficient replacement, the bug table (bottom).
To support correct bug/instruction associations, Erratacator adds an inter-
rupt input to each stage of the pipeline before state changes are committed.
This allows multi-level detection, e.g., a bug that has detection segments
composed only of signals in the write-back stage can cause an Erratacator
exception to be attributed to the instruction currently in the fetch stage.
The last major difference between the bug detectors implemented in Er-
ratacator and those proposed in Constantinides et al. is that Erratacator’s
detectors apply the signature generation and checking technique at the hard-
ware definition language (HDL) level as opposed to the layout level. Since
wire length is not a concern at the HDL level, we can combine all segment
match detection tables into a single, unified bug table. Figure 4.5 shows a
visual comparison of the two structures. The bug table also excludes the flag
bit present in each row of the segment match detection tables. Condensing
the tables into a single, more compact, bug table reduces the hardware area
required by the detector in exchange for a more complicated layout, which
the tools handle for us. Another benefit of moving to the HDL level over
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Bug Date We Found Link
1 05/2010 Waqas Ahmed’s dissertation [79]
2 05/2010 Waqas Ahmed’s dissertation [79]
3 05/2010 Waqas Ahmed’s dissertation [79]
4 05/2010 Waqas Ahmed’s dissertation [79]
5 05/2010 Waqas Ahmed’s dissertation [79]









12 10/2011 X Not reported
13 11/2011 X Not reported
14 12/2011 X http://lists.openrisc.net/
pipermail/openrisc/2011-December/
000531.html
15 01/2012 X Not reported
16 05/2012 X http://lists.openrisc.net/
pipermail/openrisc/2012-May/001115.
html
Table 4.1: A list of bugs that we implement, the date each bug was first reported,
a link to a the report of the bug, and a column, “We Found”, that contains a
mark for each bug that we uncovered in the process of building Erratacator.
the layout level is the replication of signals present at the HDL level. This
replication provides more options for processor designers to describe a bug’s
signature, leading to fewer false detections.
4.4 The Erratacator prototype
To highlight the ability of Erratacator to overcome real-world processor
bugs, we build a demonstration platform consisting of implementations of
the bug detectors described in Section 4.3 and recovery firmware described
Section 4.2. The demonstration platform is an OpenRISC OR1200-based
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Bug Type Inst M Description
1 A X The overflow flag is not updated
2 A X X The set of extend sub-word level instructions
get executed as a l.MOVHI instruction
3 T X l.MULI does not reserve the appropriate num-
ber of cycles, leading to incorrect results
4 T The carry flag is updated even when the
pipeline is frozen
5 A Division by zero does not set the carry bit
6 A X X l.FL1 is executed as l.FF1
7 L X X l.MACI instruction decoding incorrectly
8 A X X l.MULU instruction not implemented, but does
not throw an exception
9 T l.RFE takes two cycles but may have only one
to complete, corrupting data
10 T l.MACRC preceded by any MAC instruction
produces incorrect results
11 L ALU comparisons where both a and b have
their MSB set can produce incorrect results
12 T Closely consecutive exceptions can cause the
processor to stall
13 T When an exception occurs shortly after an ex-
ception return, the Supervisor Register and Ex-
ception PC register get corrupted
14 L X Writes to register 0 are not ignored
15 A X Exception registers are not updated correctly
for the align, illegal instruction, trap, and in-
terrupt exceptions that occur in the delay slot
16 T When the MMU is first enabled, the processor
prioritizes speculative data from the bus using
the virtual address as the physical address as
opposed to using cached data from the trans-
lated address
Table 4.2: Details about each processor bug that we implement. Column “Type”
lists the classification for each processor bug using a taxonomy which labels bugs
as either (L)ogic, (T)iming, or (A)lgorithm [9]. Column “Inst” contains marks
for the processor bugs that are directly tied to instructions, thus suitable for
patching using conventional mechanisms such as microcode [84, 59],
re-compilation [40], and translation [85]. The “M” column marks bugs which are
due to missing functionality: as opposed to errata-like functionality, which we
target. Finally, we provide a description of each bug.
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System-on-Chip 2 [86] with 16 publicly documented bugs [79, 80, 81]. Ta-
ble 4.1 shows the date and a pointer to the documentation for each of the 16
bugs that we implement in Erratacator. We provide a description of the bug
sufficient for understanding the evaluation results and highlight some other
important properties of each bug that we implement in Table 4.2. The most
important bug property listed in Table 4.2 is the maturity of a bug: our
work is focused on errata-like bugs, similar to what you would find in Intel’s
specification updates.
The OpenRISC OR1200 processor is an open source, 32-bit, RISC proces-
sor with a five stage pipeline. The processor includes 32KB instruction and
data caches and MMU support for virtual memory with 64 entry instruc-
tion and data translation look-aside buffers. Commercial products using the
OR1200 include Jennic Ltd.’s Zigbee RF Transceiver and Beyond Semicon-
ductors BA series of chips. The OR1200 will soon make its way into space
as a part of NASA’s TechEdSat program [87].
The reason for selecting the OR1200 is that both the processor and the bugs
are open source, which we found not to be the case with other open source
processors (e.g., Leon3 [88] and OpenSPARC [89]). In all, we found 50 unique
bugs spanning the six years that the processor has been in development (1
bug every 45 days). Due to time constraints, we implement 16 of the 50 bugs,
basing our selection on diversity and which bugs were available through SVN
rollbacks. By combining the public documentation with previous versions of
the processor in its SVN repository, we are able to accurately reproduce the
processor bugs used in our implementation.
2We couple the OR1200 with several other hardware units to form a system capable
of loading large programs and communicating with the user. This includes JTAG debug
hardware, 256 MB of DDR2 memory, 10/100 Ethernet, and a UART.
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Table 4.3: The signature and mask for each bug in our implementation. Bugs
that require more than one signature and have a alphabetic postscript after thier
ID. By default, all bits of every signal in a bug’s signature are not masked. But
bugs with multiple signatures may have conflicting signal values it the signature.
We mask such bits off and treat them as always matches. The “Mask” column
lists the masked bits signals with conflicting signature valuess; zero bits denote a
masked bit. *** denotes where we moved detection earlier in the pipeline to avoid
inter-bug signal contention. +++ signifies that the detector overpredicts due to
the limited expressiveness of the processor’s registers. ### denotes where we
made the signature less precise to reduce the possibility of inter-bug signal
contention in the system mask.
Bug Signature Mask
bug1a ovforw = 1, ov we alu = 1
bug1b ovforw mult mac = 1,
ov we mult mac = 1
bug2 id insn[31:26] = 111000, id insn[4:0]
= 01100
bug3 id insn[31:26] = 101100, id insn[9:8]
!= 11
bug4 if insn[31:26] = 111000, if insn[4:0]
= 00001, if pc[3:0] = 1000
***
bug5a alu op = 01010, div by zero = 1 alu op = 11100
bug5b alu op = 01010, a = 0x80000000, b
= 0xffffffff
bug5c alu op = 01001, div by zero = 1
bug5d alu op = 01001, a = 0x80000000, b
= 0xffff ffff
bug6 id insn[31:26] = 111000, id insn[4:0]
= 01111, id insn[9:8] = 01
bug7a alu op = 00110, ex freeze r = 0 alu op = 10000
bug7b alu op = 01011, ex freeze r = 0
bug7c alu op = 01001, ex freeze r = 0
bug7d alu op = 01010, ex freeze r = 0
bug8 id insn[31:26] = 111000, id insn[4:0]
= 01011
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.3 – continued from previous page
Bug Signature Mask
bug9 ex freeze = 0, ex branch op = 110,
sr[6] = 0
+++
bug10a id insn[31:26] = 000110,
id insn[16:0] = 0x10000,
ex insn[31:26] = 010011, ex insn[3:2]
= 00
ex insn[31:26] = 011101
bug10b id insn[31:26] = 000110,
id insn[16:0] = 0x10000,
ex insn[31:26] = 110001, ex insn[3:2]
= 00
bug11a comp op[3] = 0, sum[31] = 1, a[31]
= 0, flag we alu = 1
bug11b comp op[3] = 0, sum[31] = 1, b[31]
= 1, flag we alu = 1
bug12a ex insn[31:26] = 000101, ex insn[16]
= 1, state = 000, sig int = 1
bug12b ex insn[31:26] = 000101, ex insn[16]
= 1, state = 000, sig tick = 1
bug13a wb branch op = 110, sig int = 1
bug13b wb branch op = 110, sig tick = 1
bug14 rf addrw = 00000 ###
bug15 if pc[31:0] = 0x504, id pc[31:0] =
0x600,
***
ex pc[31:0] = 0x700, if pc[31:0] =
0x804
if pc[31:0]=0xFFFFF2FF
bug16a state = 001, hitmiss eval = 1, tag-
comp miss = 0, dcqmem ci i =
0, load, cache inhibit = 1, biu-
data valid = 1
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.3 – continued from previous page
Bug Signature Mask
bug16b state = 001,
dcram we after line load = 1,
load = 1, cache inhibit = 1,
biudata valid = 1
We implement the Erratacator prototype on the Digilent XUPV5 devel-
opment board [90]. Table 4.3 shows the signature and mask for each bug in
our implementation. The SoC runs with a maximum frequency of 90 MHz,
consuming 4,195 of the Virtex 5 FPGA’s 17,280 LUTs, 24%, and 28 of its 148
Block RAMs, 19%. In an ASIC implementation, the target for Erratacator
due to its static hardware configuration, Constantinides et al. [9] propose
reusing scan chain resources—keeping with the theme of reusing existing
processor resources to eliminate overhead and increase performance. This
reduces hardware area overhead to as little as 10%, to which we add four
32-bit registers to support the ISA extension.
The firmware portion of Erratacator comprises 4456 lines of C code (in-
cluding formal markup) and 163 lines of assembly code compiled with GCC
and the “-O3” option. The resulting binary is 14476 bytes which runs from
system memory.
Erratacator successfully runs all benchmarks on both Linux and bare
metal, with all experiments running on Linux 3.1.
4.5 Erratacator evaluation
The goal of these experiments is to answer the key questions about Errataca-
tor’s performance and scaling: Does Erratacator actually work, what is the
cost of protection, and how does the cost of protection scale with the num-
ber of bugs monitored. Motivated by poor scaling, we explore the impact
of exposing the reliability/performance tradeoff to trusted software. Finally,
we explore the relationship between the rate of recovery firmware activations
and the run time overhead experienced by software.
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For all experiments, we use MiBench [91], a set of embedded computing
benchmarks that stress different aspects of the processor. MiBench offers
benchmarks from six general areas: automotive, consumer, office, network,
security, and telecommunications. We include one application from each
area.
All experiments are run on the platform described in Section 4.4, except
we run the processor at 50 MHz. A lower frequency makes building different
hardware configurations quicker; resulting in increased researcher productiv-
ity. Also, due to the poor heat dissipation of the development board, running
at the the maximum frequency eventually overheats the FPGA, shortening
its life and causing transient faults.
4.5.1 Does Erratacator detect and safely recover from
processor bugs?























































Table 4.4: Erratacator’s ability to detect bugs, recover from bugs, the number of
signals monitored by each bug’s detector, and if the detector for each bug can
produce false detections, which then create unneeded activations of the recovery
firmware.
The primary goal of Erratacator is to prevent software state contamination
due to processor bugs. Therefore, the most important question is whether
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Erratacator can detect and flush the effects of the processor bug before it
contaminates ISA-level state, and upon detection, if Erratacator’s recovery
firmware allows the software to make correct forward progress.
For this experiment, we implement 16 of the publicly documented OR1200
bugs, 5 of which we found while implementing Erratacator (patches accepted
up stream). Table 4.2 provides details of each bug. For each bug, we im-
plement it, a software-level test case that activates the bug, and a signature
and mask for the detection fabric. We use the test case to ensure that the
detector detects bug activations and then maintains a consistent state. Note
that the software-level test case is not meant to activate a bug in every way
possible as verifying bug signatures is not the focus of our work.
Table 4.4 shows the results of this experiment, including the number of
hardware level signals used in each bug’s signature and whether the signature
could produce false detections on its own. The takeaway is that Erratacator
successfully detects all 16 bugs. Erratacator also maintains a consistent ISA-
level state, pushing software state forward safely, for 14 of the bugs.
The two bugs that Erratacator could not recover from involve flaws in
the processor’s exception processing facilities. bug12, is not recoverable in
cases of unpredictable exceptions (i.e., interrupts) because it involves the
processor corrupting micro-architectural state when it attempts to process
an new exception in the delay cycles after starting to process a previous
exception. In such cases, the processor deadlocks due to the corrupted values.
bug15, unlike bug12, is generally recoverable using the techniques presented
in this dissertation, but not recoverable in this implementation as Erratacator
repurposes the one of the affected exceptions.
bug4 presents another interesting issue, the ability to tradeoff earlier bug
detection for a possible increase in false detections. bug4 causes the supervi-
sor register to update the carry flag irrespective of any pipeline events (e.g., a
stall). In the first implementation, by the time bug2 was detected, the incon-
sistent state was committed. By adjusting the detectors to detect the bug one
pipeline stage earlier, Erratacator is able to correctly flush all contaminated
state. Early detection of bugs is also a tool for balancing contention among







































Figure 4.6: Relative execution time for each bug and benchmark
4.5.2 Does Erratacator scale with the number of bugs
monitored?
The goal of the first experiment in this section is to determine the run time
overheads due to Erratacator recovering from mostly true detections of single
bug activations. The second experiment looks at the effects of Erratacator
monitoring multiple bugs. In both experiments, the set of bugs used contains
only those bugs which are representative of errata found in commercial pro-
cessors, i.e., those not marked in the “M” column in Table 4.2. Bugs due to
processor immaturity (i.e., “we haven’t implemented overflow yet”) showed
a much higher activation rate and signature collision rate, and are our not
focus since commercial ASIC processor don’t have such issues.
In the first experiment, we look at the behavior of Erratacator when it
monitors a single bug at a time. Figure 4.6 shows the software run time
overhead for this lone bug experiment. The general lack of bug detections
shows—as expected or errata—that most bugs are so hidden in the proces-
sor’s state space that benchmarks almost never activate them. bug11 is the
exception. Both the basicmath and fft benchmarks activate bug11 by con-
taining instructions that compare two negative numbers, behavior expected
































Figure 4.7: Number of benchmark instructions per second Erratacator recovery
firmware simulates for each bug
and 120 times a second on average. Figure 4.7 shows how this bug detection
frequency translates into the number of instructions per second that Errat-
acator must simulate on behalf of software. Infrequent activations coupled
with efficient recovery produces software run time overheads of less than 1%.
Monitoring a lone bug is not sufficient. Since commercial processors have
upwards of one hundred bugs, and the ideal case is to avoid all bugs, all of the
time, the next experiment seeks to explore how software run time overheads
scale with the number of bugs monitored. Using the same platform as in
the previous experiment, in this experiment, instead of monitoring only one
of the nine errata-like bugs, Erratacator monitors an additional bug at each
iteration, with bugs added in the order of discovery.
Figure 4.8 shows the number of bug detections per second due to Errata-
cator monitoring the ever-increasing number of bugs. The figure shows that
adding bug10 dramatically increases the rate of bug detections—up to 4.5
million a second. At first glance, this seems odd, especially since none of
the bugs up to and including bug10 are triggered by any of the benchmarks
(Figure 4.7). These are false detections resulting from the signatures and
masks of bugs 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10 competing for the same, limited, resources.





































Figure 4.8: Number of Erratacator exceptions per second experienced during
each benchmark as more bugs are monitored
the hardware, bugs that require the access to the same flip-flop values must
have their signature and mask merged. Merging in a way that avoids missing
bug activations leads to false detections. In the case of this experiment, the
contention that causes the spike in detections comes from opcode bit com-
petition. This causes bugs that are heavily tied to specific instructions (e.g.,
3, 4, and 10) to fire for almost every instruction, with the differences in rates
being similar to the instruction commit rate for each benchmark.
To address the problem of over-contention for the limited system signa-
ture and mask resources, we add an ISA-level interface to Erratacator that
empowers trusted software with the ability to manage its own reliability and
performance. By controlling which bugs are monitored, software can con-
trol bug fabric resource contention, thus controlling the likelihood of false
detections. To gain insight into the affect of software managed reliability,
we conducted an experiment where software could, in effect, disable bug
detectors for bugs it could guarantee would never be activated. A prime
candidate for disabling was bug10, a bug in the multiply accumulate (MAC)
logic, because the kernel and benchmarks never use any MAC instructions.































Figure 4.9: Number of Erratacator exceptions per second experienced during
each benchmark as more bugs are monitored with software in control of its own
reliability
Figure 4.9 shows the impact of disabling a bug10 when it is guaranteed to
never activate. There is no overhead until bug11 is added, which coincides
with the fact that none of the previous bugs had activations in the lone bug
experiment and none of the bugs previous to bug11 have signature conflicts
with each other.
4.5.3 What is the cost of recovery?
The last experiment looks at how the run time overhead due to Erratacator
recovery is related to the frequency of bug detections. To do this, we modify
Erratacator to have a countdown timer trigger exception instead of a bug
detection triggered exception. After Erratacator’s recovery firmware handles
the exception, the countdown timer resets to a re-programmable value. This
way, testing software can sweep through a range of counter values, controlling
the frequency of recovery firmware invocations. Because the overhead in
this configuration is relatively in dependent of the instruction stream, the



























Instructions Between Erratacator Exceptions
Full Simulator
Trap/Return
Figure 4.10: The top line (large dashes) represents the overhead when
Erratacator recovery firmware runs with full simulation. The bottom line (small
dashes) represents the overhead due to taking an exception, backing-up the
software state, and then restoring it, i.e., trapping then returning. Six
benchmarks combined.
Figure 4.10 shows the results of this experiment, sweeping between 4096
and 262,144 instructions between recovery firmware invocations. There are
a range of recovery options from just taking the exception and returning to
full simulation. The two options shown represent opposing ends of a tradeoff
with trap/return being lower overhead, but less likely to recover and full
simulation being more overhead, but more likely to recover.
Results indicate that there is a linear relationship between the number of
recovery firmware invocations and execution times. The graph also shows
that as the frequency of invocations increases, the difference between just
trapping and returning and employing the full firmware grows. This high-
lights an opportunity for using more time consuming recovery routines in an
effort to reduce the likelihood of future bug detections.
4.5.4 Why recovery works
In this section, we describe why recovery works for each errata-like bug in
our implementation. For each bug, we show a snippet of code from the
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Bug Type Description Why recovers
3 T l.MULI followed by a result
read
Trap and return
4 T The carry flag is updated pre-
maturely
Restricted environment
9 T l.RFE returns to the wrong ad-
dress
Trap and return
10 T l.MACRC reads incomplete re-
sults
Trap and return
12 T Processor stall due to consecu-
tive exceptions
No recovery
13 T Bad updates to exception reg-
isters
Recoding
16 T Wrong data sourced used for a
load
Trap and return
11 L Bad ALU comparisons Recoding
5 A Division by zero does not set
carry
Recoding
Table 4.5: Why recovery works. Column “Type” lists the classification for each
processor bug using a taxonomy which labels bugs as either (L)ogic, (T)iming, or
(A)lgorithm [9]. We also provide a description of each bug and a high-level idea
of why recovery works.
OR1200 processor that contains the bug (commented out) and the fix. Using
the code snippet for reference, we describe how software activates the bug
and the possible effects that the activated bug can have on software. With
an understanding of how software activates the bug and the bug’s effects
on software, we describe the specific set of system states and events that
differentiate the buggy line of code from the correct line of code. Knowing
which system states and events to avoid leads naturally to a discussion of how
our recovery mechanism recodes the instruction stream to avoid reactivating
the bug. Before going into detail on how Erratacator recovers from each bug,
we summarize the results of the analysis and discuss the high-level takeaways.
Summary
Table 4.5 provides a high-level summary of why recovery works for each
errata-like bug in our implementation. The table organizes bugs by their
type (according to the taxonomy proposed by Constantinides et al. [9]), with
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the aim of seeing if similar bug types have similar recovery strategies. As
shown in the table, we found three classes of recovery: (1) Trap and return;
(2) Restricted environment; and (3) Recoding.
Trap and return recovery is when taking an exception and returning imme-
diately from the interrupt service routine perturbs the processor enough to
allow software execution past the bug. Trap and return recovery is sufficient
for recovering from bug3, bug9, bug10, and bug16. Notice that all of these
bugs are related to the timing of processor states and events.
Restricted environment recovery is when executing a potentially bug acti-
vating instruction in the more restrictive environment of the recovery firmware
(in the sense that there are less events that can occur) is guaranteed to
avoid activating the bug. One example of how executing inside the recovery
firmware restricts the environment is the lack of exceptions. Instructions
running in the recovery firmware will never be interrupted because the re-
covery firmware runs as the highest priority code on the system and during
its execution, the processor ignores all other exceptions and interrupts. bug4
represents a case where a restricted environment is sufficient for recovery.
The last class of recovery is the recoding scheme that we discuss in Sec-
tion 4.2. In this class of recovery, we recode instruction streams from the
software stack to route execution around the bug. This is the most general-
purpose recovery class of the three as it encompasses the other two classes,
but it is also the most costly in terms of software run time overhead. bug13,
bug11, and bug5 require this level of recovery.
bug3
This bug is the result of the processor not reserving enough cycles for the
l.MULI instruction. Listing 4.6 shows the source code for the bug and what
the fix looks like. The purpose of the code in the listing is to determine (dur-
ing the decode stage) how many cycles to freeze the pipeline for in the execute
stage. It looks like the processor’s designers copied the code for the l.MACRC
instruction. The problem is that l.MULI uses an immediate operand, which
is at bit index 16, while l.MACRC does not have an immediate operand (bit
16 is a reserved bit in l.MACRC).
So, the processor only reserves enough time for l.MULI to execute when
the value its immediate has a 1 in index 16. Even when the bit at index 16
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// Encode wait on signal
always @(id insn) begin
case (id insn[31:26])
‘OR1200 OR32 ALU:
wait on = ( 1’b0
‘OR1200 OR32 MULI:
// BUG: 17th bit of instruction is immediate
// wait on = id insn[16] ? ‘OR1200 WAIT ON MULTMAC :
// ‘OR1200 WAIT ON NOTHING;
// FIX: stall the pipeline for the needed cycles
wait on = ‘OR1200 WAIT ON MULTMAC;
‘OR1200 OR32 MACRC:
wait on = id insn[16] ? ‘OR1200 WAIT ON MULTMAC :
‘OR1200 WAIT ON NOTHING;
Listing 4.6: bug3 source code
is a 0, software may still get correct results as the multiply unit continues to
process in the background. Software will only see incorrect results when the
bit at index 16 is 0 and a later instruction uses the output of l.MULI before
the multiplier completes execution. In that case, the instruction that uses
the result of l.MULI sees partial results, which then corrupts its own result.
In this case, we recover by executing a series of shifts and adds in the place
of l.MULI. These instructions complete in a single cycle and completely avoid
activating the buggy line shown in Listing 4.6, thus routing execution around
the bug.
bug4
This bug is the result of the carry flag in the supervisor register being updated
regardless of any pipeline freezes or pipeline flushes. Listing 4.7 shows that
the correct line includes information on the state of the pipeline (i.e., if it
is frozen or flushed), but the buggy line does not. This means that the
most recent carry result is always the one stored—and available to future
instructions—in the supervisor register, even if the instruction that created
the carry value is frozen in the execute stage or has been flushed. This means
later instructions will potentially see a carry value not consistent with the
rest of the system’s state, creating an off-by-one error. For instance, if a
program issues a l.ADDC instruction with the carry flag set, but where it
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// Register file write enable is either from SPRS or normal from CPU control
always @(‘OR1200 RST EVENT rst or posedge clk)
if (rst == ‘OR1200 RST VALUE)
rf we allow <= 1’b1;
else if (˜wb freeze)
rf we allow <= ˜flushpipe;
assign rf we = ((spr valid & spr write) | (we & ˜wb freeze)) & rf we allow;
// BUG: not taking into account freezes of flushes
// assign cy we o = cy we i;
//FIX: Only enable writes when not frozen and not flushed
assign cy we o = cy we i && ˜wb freeze && rf we allow;
Listing 4.7: bug4 source code
does not produce a carry, and an exception occurs, when the instruction is
executed again, there will be no carry and the result will be incorrect.
The critical difference between the correct line and the buggy line shown
in Listing 4.7 occurs when the instruction is flushed from the pipeline, i.e.,
the instruction’s results are not committed to ISA-level state, and it gets
re-executed again. As long as the recoded instruction sequence does not
exhibit this specific behavior, recovery will be successful. This is the cases
for execution inside the recovery firmware. Erratacator runs as the highest
priority code on the system and it is not interruptable by any other excep-
tion. This means that it is impossible to interrupt a carry using instruction
when it is executed inside the recovery firmware, meaning no risk of pipeline
flushes invalidating carry results prematurely stored to ISA-level state. In
this case we do not even need to recode the instruction, just change slightly
the environment that it executes in.
There is still the problem of meeting the recovery firmware’s assumptions
with this bug. The recovery firmware assumes that the ISA-level state
is consistent when it starts execution, but this bug updates—potentially
corrupting—ISA-level state after one cycle in the execute stage—even if it is
frozen. This requires that we detect the bug early, in the decode stage, and
recode and execute both the bug inducing instruction and the instruction
before the bug inducing instruction.
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assign alu op sdiv = (alu op == ‘OR1200 ALUOP DIV);
assign alu op udiv = (alu op == ‘OR1200 ALUOP DIVU);
assign alu op div = alu op sdiv | alu op udiv;
// If b, the divisor, is zero and this is a division
assign div by zero = !(|b) & alu op div;
// BUG: No assignment to the carry flag
// FIX: Drive the carry flag
assign cy div = div by zero;
Listing 4.8: bug5 source code
bug5
The OR1000 architecture specification states that division by zero results
in the processor setting the carry flag. The section of code in Listing 4.8
shows that the processor does not assign anything to the carry flag based
on the results of division. Thus, when software performs a divide-by-zero,
the carry flag will not change and software will have no way of knowing of
the divide-by-zero condition. Note that all other division operations produce
correct results as the processor specification states that division operations
only change the value of the carry flag in divide-by-zero situations.
Therefore, for recovery we just need to make sure that we set the carry flag
in divide-by-zero conditions. A valid recovery routine in this case consists of
executing the division inside the simulator—no recoding—and checking if the
divisor is zero, updating the carry flag if it is. The actual recovery routine
that we employ is more complicated, but also more general purpose. We
recode the division into a set of shift, subtraction, AND, and OR operations,
also including a check for zero valued divisors. Our general-purpose recoding
routine incurs more overhead, but is likely to recover from a greater number
of bugs in the division unit.
bug9
Listing 4.9 shows a bug where the processor does not treat the return from
exception instruction (l.RFE) as a multi-cycle instruction. This bug produces
an error when software returns from an exception and the address that the
processor’s exception handling logic passes control to (stored in the Exception
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// Decode of multicycle
always @(id insn) begin
case (id insn[31:26])
// Return from exception
‘OR1200 OR32 RFE,
// BUG: l.RFE does not reserve two cycles
// multicycle = ‘OR1200 ONE CYCLE;
// FIX: request two cycles when you see l.RFE
multicycle = ‘OR1200 TWO CYCLES;
‘OR1200 OR32 MFSPR:
// to read from ITLB/DTLB (sync RAMs)
multicycle = ‘OR1200 TWO CYCLES;
// Single cycle instructions
default: begin




Listing 4.9: bug9 source code
Program Counter Register, EPCR) is resident in the instruction cache. When
this situation occurs, the Instruction MMU will not have enough time to
perform the address translation before the cache acknowledges the request
(physically addressed caches). When software encounters this situation, it
receives corrupt data from the instruction cache and executes the wrong
instruction.
The system conditions where the difference between the correct line and
the buggy line (shown in Listing 4.9) become meaningful are when the l.RFE
instruction requires two cycles to determine the correct return address, but
it only gets a single cycle to execute. The specific case when l.RFE requires
two cycles to execute is when there is a I-TLB miss, but an I-Cache hit. The
specific case where l.RFE only gets a single cycle to execute is when there
is no freeze in the execute stage of the pipeline: it moves straight to the
write-back stage.
An ad hoc recovery routine could simply read the return address from
EPCR, invalidate the cache line associated with the return address, and
return to the software stack. The software stack will then be able to execute
the l.RFE instruction with no risk of hitting the bug—because there will be
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// BUG: The signal mac stall r didn’t exist and MAC operations
// would conflict with a proceeding l.MACRC
// FIX: Add a stall signal to freeze the pipeline while l.MACRC completes
// Stall CPU if l.macrc is in ID and MAC still has to process l.mac
// instructions in EX stage (e.g. inside multiplier)
// This stall signal is also used by the divider.
always @(‘OR1200 RST EVENT rst or posedge clk)
if (rst == ‘OR1200 RST VALUE)
mac stall r <= 1’b0;
else
mac stall r <= (|mac op | (|mac op r1) | (|mac op r2)) &
(id macrc op | mac stall r);
Listing 4.10: bug10 source code
a cache miss. An even simpler, but more risky, recovery strategy would be
to just take the trap and return to the software stack, relying on the I-TLB
to load the translation for the return address.
Our general-purpose recovery routine, on the other hand, executes the
l.RFE instruction inside the simulator, using the virtualized state of soft-
ware. The simulator computes directly the return address of the instruction
and transfers control only in its virtual state. Also, there is no risk of the
simulator activating this bug itself when it returns control to the software
stack using the l.REF instruction, because it disables the cache as part of its
entry routine.
bug10
The multiply-accumulate (MAC) unit has it own pipeline of instructions so
that the core pipeline of the processor does not have to wait for multi-cycle
MAC instructions to complete before advancing. The only time the processor
needs to wait for the completion of a MAC instruction is when software
queries its value, which is rare because, as opposed to traditional instructions,
most MAC instructions do not expect a return value after executing. On the
OR1200, the only MAC instruction that can read the value of the MAC unit
is the MAC read and clear instruction (l.MACRC).
As shown in Listing 4.10, bug10 is the result of a the l.MACRC instruction
not waiting for the MAC pipeline to empty before storing the current accu-
mulator value in the instruction’s destination register. This bug manifests
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assign {cy sum, result sum} = (a − b + 1) + carry in;
// signed compare when comp op[3] is set
assign a lt b = comp op[3] ? ((a[width−1] & !b[width−1]) |
(!a[width−1] & !b[width−1] & result sum[width−1])|
(a[width−1] & b[width−1] & result sum[width−1])):
// BUG 1: Have no look at all bits
// a < b if (a − b) subtraction wrapped and a[width−1] wasn’t set
// (result sum[width−1] & !a[width−1]) |
// if (a − b) wrapped and both a[width−1] and b[width−1] were set
// (result sum[width−1] & a[width−1] & b[width−1] );
(a < b);
Listing 4.11: bug11 source code
as an error when a l.MACRC instruction is preceded by any other MAC
instruction. Software that triggers this bug will see stale results from the
accumulator.
This, like the previous bug, is a case where recovery is achieved by taking
the trap created by the bug detectors and returning control back to the
software stack. Doing this creates enough of a time buffer between earlier
MAC instructions and the l.MACRC instruction that there is no risk of
the MAC pipeline being active when the processor executes the l.MACRC
instruction. Our recovery mechanism works in much the same manner, but
our time buffer comes from the need to fetch, decode, and recode another
instruction from the software stack: we only recode one instruction at a time.
bug11
The bug shown in Listing 4.11 has taken many forms in the life of the OR1200
processor. The code listing shows the processor designer’s final attempt to fix
the issue before punting to the synthesis tool to implement the comparison
correctly. Generally speaking, the bug involves an incorrect comparison of
large (i.e., the two most significant bits are set) unsigned operands. An
example set of values (kept to 4-bits for clarity) that trigger this bug are
a = 0111 and b = 0110: a > b. Given those values, result sum = 1101
and the processor incorrectly reports that a < b. Software that attempts to
compare two sufficiently large numbers will get results that incorrectly favor
operand b being larger than operand a. These corrupted comparisons not
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except type <= ‘OR1200 EXCEPT ILLEGAL;
epcr <= ex dslot ?
wb pc : delayed1 ex dslot ?
// BUG: Wrong PC saved due to delay slot
// id pc : delayed2 ex dslot ?
// id pc : id pc;
// FIX: Keep track of two levels of delay
dl pc : delayed2 ex dslot ?
id pc : ex pc;
Listing 4.12: bug15 source code
only contaminate data, but lead to incorrect control flows.
To recover from buggy comparisons, the recovery firmware recodes com-
parisons using other comparison instructions and by flipping the operands.
In this case, to route execution around the buggy less than comparison (a
< b), the recovery firmware will compute (a >= b), then invert the result,
finally updating the virtualized flag register. In cases where all compare
operations rely on the same hardware-level compare logic, it is possible to
adjust both operand values, or even use arithmetic operations and check the
carry flag.
bug12
We cannot recover from this bug, because the bug creates errors in how the
processor handles exceptions and the detectors heavily rely on the processor’s
exception handling. Specifically, this bug causes the processor to lock in the
exception handling finite state machine.
bug15
This bug is a failure of the processor’s exception handling mechanism to cor-
rectly save the Program Counter (PC) in the event of certain exceptions.
Ideally, when an exception occurs, the processor atomically saves the state
of software that gets overwritten when the processor passes control to the ex-
ception handler. In the case of the OR1200, the instruction set specification
dictates that the processor saves the PC in the Exception Program Counter
Register (EPCR), the Supervisor Register (SR) in the Exception Supervi-
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sor Register (ESR), and for instructions that compute an address (e.g., load
and store), the effective address in the Exception Effective Address Register
(EEAR). Saving the correct PC value is not straight forward in the OR1200
due to the delay slot instruction: the instruction after a branch/jump that
always gets executed. If an exception occurs in a delay slot, the processor
must save the PC of the previous (branch/jump) instruction in the EPCR.
Listing 4.12 shows a bug in how the processor saves the PC for Illegal In-
struction Exceptions, due to the delay slot problem.
Software that has a delay slot instruction interrupted by an exception that
activates bug13 will not return from the exception handler to the correct
address. Most of the time, the branch/jump instruction is effectively ignored
as the exception returns to the delay slot. This corrupts the control flow of
software.
We do not recover from this bug because the bug breaks the exception
support logic that Erratacator relies on to bridge detection and recovery. In
general, recovery is possible. In the general case, the recovery firmware simu-
lates taking the exception, updating software’s virtualized state accordingly.
The recovery firmware then returns control to the software stack, which is
now inside an exception handler, but with the correct value in EPCR.
bug16
This bug causes the processor to accept data from the bus even though the
cache is enabled and there is a cache hit. Listing 4.13 shows both the buggy
lines and the correct lines for both the data and instruction cache. Because
both the instruction and the data cache are affected by the bug, software
will see both corrupted instructions and corrupted data loads. Software
triggers this bug when it enables the cache and subsequently loads a data or
instruction word that is resident in the cache. This is a very timing critical
bug in that there must be a pending request on the bus that is serviced just
as software enables the cache, which reports a hit.
Since this is such a timing-sensitive bug, taking the trap created by the
detector and returning control to software is enough to perturb the timing
of events to avoid the bug.
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In or1200 ic fsm.v
// Asserted when a cache hit occurs and the first word is ready/valid
assign first hit ack = (state == ‘OR1200 ICFSM CFETCH) & hitmiss eval &
!tagcomp miss & !cache inhibit;
// BUG: Bus data takes precedence over cache when cache enabled
// assign first miss ack = (state == ‘OR1200 ICFSM CFETCH) & biudata valid;
// FIX: Cache overpowers bus when it is enabled
// Asserted when a cache miss occurs, but the first word of the new
// cache line is ready (on the bus)
// Cache hits overpower bus data
assign first miss ack = (state == ‘OR1200 ICFSM CFETCH) & biudata valid &
˜first hit ack;
In or1200 dc fsm.v
// BUG: Bus has precedence over enabled cache
// assign first miss ack = load miss ack | load inhibit ack;
// first hit ack takes precedence over first miss ack
assign first miss ack = ˜first hit ack & (load miss ack | load inhibit ack);
Listing 4.13: bug16 source code
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Extendability
The detection technique is generally applicable to all sequential hardware.
The paper that proposed the processor bug detection mechanism imple-
mented by Erratacator explains and provides examples of how it is possible
to always link the value of any wire/signal in arbitrary hardware to a set
of register (i.e., flip-flop) values. As shown in Erratacator’s evaluation, this
may lead to false positives.
Recovery is more complex as there needs to be a way for software/firmware
to emulate the behavior of the buggy hardware. Recovering from bug detec-
tions internal to a processor rely on redundancy within the ISA. Recovering
from bus and memory bug detections relies on the ability to use different-sized
memory access instructions. Recovering from bug detections in performance-
only related components of the processor, e.g., cache and TLB, can default to
disabling the component until it is safe to enable it. Recovering from bugs in
peripherals (e.g., Ethernet controller) relies on the interface that the periph-
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eral exposes to software. The Erratacator evaluation contains bugs internal
to the processor and bugs in performance-only components. Erratacator also
supports recoding IO/memory accesses.
4.6.2 Using other processor bug detectors
One of the contributions of Erratacator is creating a complete system with
a single-exception-wire detector interface. Processor designers can connect
the output of whatever processor bug detection mechanism that best meets
their needs to this interface. As long as the bug detector provides low latency
detection, it works.
We do not go into detail on alternative bug detection techniques because
it is not our focus.
4.6.3 Erratacator’s effects on system security
Adding components to a system increases functionality at the cost of in-
creased complexity, which can negatively impact the security of the system.
Thus, when adding a component to a system, it is critical to re-evaluate
the security of that system. In this section, we examine potential security
vulnerabilities created by adding our bug detectors and recovery firmware
to a system. We break the discussion into two cases: security vulnerabili-
ties resulting from the new components, assuming correct configuration, and
vulnerabilities arising from misconfigurations of the system.
In analyzing Erratacator for new security vulnerabilities, we identify two
high level concerns: 1) can the attacker observe, from the ISA level of ab-
straction, sub-ISA-level state of the system and 2) can the attacker gain any
new control over the system. In terms of opening up new vectors of system
control, we observe that in an Erratacator protected system (assuming a cor-
rectly configured system) attackers generally have no more control than in
an unprotected system. At most, an attacker can issue instruction sequences
that activate Erratacator’s bug detectors, which then invokes recovery. In
the worst case, this effectively locks the system for the attacking process’s
time slice—a self denial-of-service.
With respect to revealing sub-ISA-level state of the system, Erratacator
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increases the amount of information available to attackers. Recall that Er-
ratacator’s goal is to reinforce the ISA: supporting software’s assumption of
a perfect processor. The problem is that the instruction set specification
does not completely specify the run-time state of the system, even at the
ISA level. This means that there exists, at run time, low level processor
state visible to software that Erratacator does not simulate. For instance,
the ISA provides no notion of time and thus, different implementations of
the specification are free to differ in how long it takes a given instruction to
execute. This also means that an attacker can use differences in the time
taken by different instruction sequences to find out if they are running on
an Erratacator protected system and what protections are in place. The
current implementation of Erratacator does not attempt to hide from the
software stack (but it is protected from the software stack), so it is trivial for
an attacker to detect its presence.
We could attempt to hide from the software stack by augmenting the design
of Erratacator so that it virtualizes the timer register, but curious users could
still use a remote time server and cleverly crafted instruction sequences to
infer whether the system was protected by Erratacator or not. Note that this
weakness is not distinct to Erratacator, but a general problem faced when
employing any form of hardware virtualization [92, 93]. So, instead of adding
the overhead and complexity, we assume that the software stack knows what
protections are in place. Even when the attacker knows what protections
are in place, they have no more information and gain no additional control
compared to an unprotected system because attackers already have access to
errata documents.
We now consider the security implications of a misconfigured system. A
misconfiguration of the detectors via a corrupted system signature or system
mask can result in missed bugs activations and an increased chance of false
detections. Missing bug activations leaves the system vulnerable to attack
if the user can identify the misconfiguration and then exploit the processor
bug. An increased risk of false detections results in unneeded invocations
of the recovery firmware, adding software run time overhead. Taken to the
extreme, a corrupted system signature or system mask does not make an
Erratacator protected system more vulnerable than an unprotected system,
just slower.
Another possible misconfiguration is of the recovery firmware. While it is
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safe to assume that the recoding routines are correct—since we formally verify
them—the entry, instruction processing (i.e., fetch from software stack and
decode), and exit routines are vulnerable to misconfiguration. Errors in these
routines appear as processor bugs to the software stack and can manifest in
the same ways as processor bugs. Given that coding these routines is the
least automated and most complex part of building the recovery firmware,
these routines are a prime place for bugs. In fact, we experienced several
bugs in the entry and exit routines while building Erratacator. The critical,
but buggy nature of the entry and exit routines and their regular structure
motivates the use of formal verification to avoid misconfiguration.
The worst case misconfiguration is allowing unrestricted access to Errat-
acator’s components. In such cases, attackers can use Erratacator’s bug de-
tectors to gain low-level insight on the state of the processor or to efficiently
interpose on other processes and the operating system. Since Erratacator
is essentially a lightweight hypervisor, an attacker controlling Erratacator
is equivalent to the Virtual Machine-based Rootkit proposed by King and
colleagues [92]. We protect Erratacator by separating it from the software
stack using hardware fences that prevent memory contamination and privi-
lege checks on accesses to the detectors and other Erratacator support reg-
isters. These protections assume that software is correct, thus any security
vulnerabilities in software are an opportunity for an attacker to compromise
Erratacator.
4.7 Conclusion
The key to Erratacator’s practicality is leveraging the insight that proces-
sors have sufficient innate functionality to detect and recover from processor
bugs. Low latency detection enables the processor pipeline to flush con-
taminated state before it makes it to the software level, fulfilling the role
of a checkpointing and rollback mechanism. The redundancy of processor
functionality enables the replacement of multiple redundant executions or
multiple redundant executors. Finally, allowing software to manage its own





Modern hardware design processes closely resemble the software design pro-
cess. Hardware designs consist of millions of lines of code and often leverage
libraries, toolkits, and components from multiple vendors. These designs are
then “compiled” (synthesized) for fabrication. As with software, the grow-
ing complexity of hardware designs creates opportunities for hardware to
become a vehicle for malice. Recent work has demonstrated that small ma-
licious modifications to a hardware-level design can compromise the security
of the entire computing system [4].
Malicious hardware has two key properties that make it even more dam-
aging than malicious software. First, hardware presents a more persistent
attack vector. Whereas software vulnerabilities can be fixed via software up-
date patches or reimaging, fixing well-crafted hardware-level vulnerabilities
would likely require physically replacing the compromised hardware compo-
nents. A hardware recall similar to Intel’s Pentium FDIV bug (which cost
500 million dollars to recall five million chips) has been estimated to cost
many billions of dollars today [94]. Furthermore, the skill required to replace
hardware and the rise of deeply embedded systems ensure that vulnerable
systems will remain in active use after the discovery of the vulnerability. Sec-
ond, hardware is the lowest layer in the computer system, providing malicious
hardware with control over the software running above. This low-level control
enables sophisticated and stealthy attacks aimed at evading software-based
defenses.
Such an attack might use a special, or unlikely, event to trigger deeply
buried malicious logic which was inserted during design time. For exam-
ple, attackers might introduce a sequence of bytes into the hardware that
activates the malicious logic. This logic might escalate privileges, turn off
access control checks, or execute arbitrary instructions, providing a path for
the malefactor to take control of the machine. The malicious hardware thus
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provides a foothold for subsequent system-level attacks.
In this dissertation we present the design, implementation, and evalua-
tion of BlueChip, a hybrid design-time/runtime system for detecting and
neutralizing malicious circuits. During the design phase, BlueChip flags as
suspicious, any unused circuitry (any circuit not activated by any of the
many design verification tests) and deactivates them. However, these seem-
ingly suspicious circuits might actually be part of a legitimate circuit within
the design, so BlueChip inserts circuitry to raise an exception whenever one
of these suspicious circuits would have been activated. The exception han-
dler software is responsible for emulating hardware instructions to allow the
system to continue execution. BlueChip’s overall goal is to push the com-
plexity of coping with malicious hardware up to a higher, more flexible, and
adaptable layer in the system stack.
The contributions of this reference implementation are:
• We present the BlueChip system (Sections 5.2 and 5.3), which auto-
matically removes potentially malicious circuits from a hardware design
and uses low-level software to emulate around removed hardware.
• We propose an algorithm (Section 5.4), called unused circuit identifica-
tion, for automatically identifying circuits that avoid affecting outputs
during design verification. We demonstrate its feasibility (Section 5.5)
for use in addressing the problem of detecting malicious hardware.
• We demonstrate (Sections 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8), using fully-tested mali-
cious hardware modifications as test cases on a SPARC processor im-
plementation operating on an FPGA, that: (1) the system successfully
prevents three different malicious hardware modifications, and (2) the
performance effects (and hence the overhead) of the system are small.
5.1 Motivation and attack model
This dissertation focuses on the problem of malicious circuits introduced
during the hardware design process. Today’s complicated hardware designs
are increasingly vulnerable to the undetected insertion of malicious circuitry
to create a hardware trojan horse. In other domains, examples of this general
type of intentional insertion of malicious functionality include compromises of
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(a) Circuit designed (b) Attack inserted (c) Suspicious circuits  
      identified and removed 
(d) Hardware triggers  
      emulation software 
12#
design-time run-time 
Figure 5.1: Overall BlueChip architecture. This figure shows the overall flow for
BlueChip where (a) designers develop hardware designs and (b) a rogue designer
inserts malicious logic into the design. During design verification phase, (c)
BlueChip identifies and removes suspicious circuits and inserts runtime hardware
checks. (d) During runtime, these hardware checks invoke software exceptions to
provide the BlueChip software an opportunity to advance the computation by
emulating instructions, even though BlueChip may have removed legitimate
circuits.
software development tools [95], system designers inserting malicious source
code intentionally [96, 97, 98], compromised servers that host modified source
code [99, 100], and products that come pre-installed with malware [101, 102,
103]. Such attacks introduce little risk of punishment, because the complexity
of modern systems and prevalence of unintentional bugs makes it difficult to
prove malice or to correctly attribute the problem to its source [104].
More specifically, our threat model is that a rogue designer covertly adds
trojan circuits to a hardware design. We focus on two possible scenarios for
such rogue insertion. First, one or more disgruntled employees at a hard-
ware design company surreptitiously and intentionally inserts malicious cir-
cuits into a design prior to final design validation with the hope that the
changes will evade detection. The malicious hardware demonstrated by King
et al. [4] support the plausibility of this scenario, in that only small and local-
ized changes (e.g.,, to a single hardware source file) are sufficient for creating
powerful malicious circuits designed for bootstrapping larger system-level at-
tacks. We call such malicious circuits footholds, and such footholds persist
even after malicious software has been discovered and removed, giving at-
tackers a permanent vector into a compromised system.
The second scenario is enabled by the trend toward “softcores” and other
pre-designed hardware IP (intellectual property) blocks. Many system-on-
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chip (SoC) designs aggregate subcomponents from existing commercial or
open-source IP. Although generally trusted, these third-party IP blocks may
not be trustworthy. In this scenario, an attacker can create new IP or modify
existing IP blocks to add malicious circuits. The attacker then distributes
or licenses the IP in the hope that some SoC creator will incorporate it
and include it in a fabricated chip. Although the SoC creator will likely per-
form significant design verification focused on finding design bugs, traditional
black-box design verification is unlikely to reveal malicious hardware.
In either scenario, the attacker’s motivation could be financial or general
malice. If the design modification remains undetected by final design valida-
tion and verification, the malicious circuitry will be present in the manufac-
tured hardware that is shipped to customers and integrated into computing
systems. The attacker has achieved this without the resources necessary to
actually fabricate a chip or otherwise attacking the manufacturing and distri-
bution supply chain. We assume that only one or a few individuals are acting
maliciously (i.e.,, not the entire design team) and that these individuals are
unable to compromise the final end-to-end design verification and validation
process, which is typically performed by a distinct group of engineers.
Our approach to detecting insertions of malicious hardware assumes analy-
sis at the level of a hardware netlist or hardware description language (HDL)
source. In the two scenarios outlined, this assumption is reasonable, as (1)
design validation and verification is primarily performed at this level and (2)
softcore IP blocks are often distributed in HDL or netlist form.
We assume the system software is trustworthy and non-malicious (although
the malicious hardware may attempt to subvert the overlying software layers).
5.2 The BlueChip approach
Our overall BlueChip architecture is shown in Figure 5.1. In the first phase
of operation, BlueChip analyzes the circuit’s behavior during design verifica-
tion to identify candidate circuits that might be malicious. Once BlueChip
identifies a suspect circuit, BlueChip automatically removes the circuit from
the design. Because BlueChip might remove legitimate circuits as part of the
transformation, it inserts logic to detect if the removed circuits would have
been activated, and triggers an exception if the hardware encounters this con-
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dition during runtime. The hardware delivers this exception to the BlueChip
software layer. The exception handling software is responsible for recovering
from the fault and advancing the computation by emulating the instruction
that was executing when the exception occurred. BlueChip pushes much of
the complexity up to the software layer, allowing defenders to rapidly refine
defenses, turning the permanence of the hardware attack into a disadvantage
for attackers.
BlueChip can operate in spite of removed hardware because the removed
circuits operate at a lower layer of abstraction than the software emula-
tion layer responsible for recovery. BlueChip software does not emulate
the removed hardware directly. Instead, BlueChip software emulates the
effects of removed hardware using a simple, high-level, and implementation-
independent specification of hardware, i.e.,, the processor’s instruction-set-
architecture specification. The BlueChip software emulates the effects of the
removed hardware by emulating one or more instructions, updating the pro-
cessor registers and memory values, and resuming execution. The computa-
tion can generally make forward progress despite the removed hardware logic,
although software emulation of instructions is slower than normal hardware
execution.
In some respects our overall BlueChip system resembles floating point in-
struction emulation for processors that omit floating point hardware. If a
processor design omits floating point unit (FPU) hardware, floating point in-
structions raise an exception that the OS handles. The OS can emulate the
effects of the missing hardware using available integer instructions. Like FPU
emulation, BlueChip uses software to emulate the effects of missing hardware
using the available hardware resources. However, the hardware BlueChip re-
moves is not necessarily associated with specific instructions and can trigger
BlueChip exceptions at unpredictable states and events, presenting a number
of unique challenges that we address in Section 5.3.
5.3 BlueChip design
This section describes the design of BlueChip. We discuss the BlueChip
hardware component (Section 5.3.1), the BlueChip software component (Sec-
tion 5.3.2), and possible alternative architectures (Section 5.3.3). Section 5.4
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discusses our algorithm for identifying suspicious circuits and Section 5.5 de-
scribes how BlueChip uses these detection results to modify the hardware
design.
We present general requirements for applying BlueChip to hardware and
to software, but we describe our specific design for a modified processor and
recovery software running within an operating system.
5.3.1 BlueChip hardware
To apply BlueChip techniques, a hardware component must be able to meet
three general requirements. First, BlueChip requires a hardware exception
mechanism for passing control to the software. Second, BlueChip must pre-
vent modified hardware state from committing when the hardware triggers
a BlueChip exception. Third, to enable recovery the hardware must provide
software access to hardware state, such as processor register values and other
architecturally visible state.
Processors are well suited to meet the requirements for BlueChip because
they already have many of the mechanisms BlueChip requires. Processors
provide easy access to architecturally visible states to enable context switch-
ing, and processors have existing exception delivery mechanisms that pro-
vide a convenient way to pass control to a software exception handler. Also,
most processors support precise exceptions that include a lightweight recov-
ery mechanism to prevent committing any state associated with the excep-
tion. As a result, we use existing exception handling mechanisms within the
processor to deliver BlueChip exceptions.
One modification we make to current exception semantics is to assert
BlueChip exceptions immediately instead of associating them with individ-
ual instructions. In current processors, many exceptions are associated with
a specific instruction that caused the fault. However, in BlueChip it is often
unclear which individual instruction would have triggered the removed logic.
Thus, BlueChip asserts the exception immediately, flushes the pipeline, and
































Figure 5.2: Basic flow for an instruction-by-instruction emulator. This figure
shows how a software emulator can calculate the changes to processor registers
induced by an or instruction.
5.3.2 BlueChip software
The BlueChip software is responsible for recovering from BlueChip hardware
exceptions and providing a mechanism for system forward progress. This
responsibility presents unusual design challenges for the BlueChip software
because it runs on a processor that has had some portions of the design
removed, therefore some features of the processor may be unavailable to the
BlueChip exception handler software.
To handle BlueChip exceptions, BlueChip uses a recovery technique where
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the BlueChip software emulates faulting instructions to carry out the compu-
tation. The basic emulation strategy is similar to an instruction-by-instruction
emulator, where for each instruction, BlueChip software reads the instruc-
tion from memory, decodes the instruction, calculates the effects of the in-
struction, and commits the register and memory changes (Figure 5.2). By
emulating instructions in software, BlueChip skips past the instructions that
use the removed hardware, duplicating their effects in software, providing
the opportunity for the system to continue making forward progress despite
the missing circuits.
One problem with our first implementation of this basic strategy was that
our emulation routines sometimes depended on removed hardware, thus caus-
ing unrecoverable recursive BlueChip exceptions. For example, the “shadow-
mode attack” (Section 5.6) uses a “bootstrap trigger” that initiates the at-
tack. The bootstrap trigger circuit monitors the values going into the data
cache and enables the attack once it observes a specific value being stored
in memory. This specific value will always trigger the attack regardless of
the previous states and events in the system. After BlueChip identified and
removed the attack circuits, the BlueChip hardware triggered an exception
whenever the software attempted to store the attack value to a memory loca-
tion. Our first implementation of the store emulation code simply re-issued
a store instruction with the same address and value to emulate the effects
of the removed logic, thus creating an unrecoverable recursive exception.
To avoid unrecoverable recursive BlueChip exceptions, we emulate around
faulting instructions by producing semantically equivalent results while avoid-
ing BlueChip exception states. For ALU operations, we map the emulated
instructions to an alternative set of ALU operations and equivalent, but dif-
ferent, operand values. For example, we implement or emulation using a se-
ries of xor, and nand instructions rather than executing an or to perform OR
operations (Figure 5.3). For load and store instructions we have somewhat
less flexibility because these instructions are the sole means for performing
I/O operations that access off-processor memory. However, we do perform
some transformations, such as emulating word sized accesses using byte sized
accesses and vice versa.
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Xor t1, 0xffffffff, t1!
Xor t2, 0xffffffff, t2!
Nand t1, t2, t3!
Store t3, regs[4]!







Figure 5.3: BlueChip emulation. This figure shows how BlueChip emulates
around removed hardware. First, (1) the software executes an or instruction, (2)
which causes a BlueChip exception. This exception is handled by the BlueChip
software, (3) which emulates the or instruction using xor and nand instructions
(4) before returning control to the next instruction in the program.
5.3.3 Alternative designs
In this section we discuss other possible designs and some of the trade offs
inherent in their design decisions. BlueChip delivers exceptions using existing
processor exception handling mechanisms. One alternative could be adding
new hardware to deliver exceptions to the BlueChip software component. In
our current design, BlueChip is constrained by the semantics of the existing
exception handling mechanisms and cannot deliver exceptions when software
disables interrupts.
An alternative approach could have been to add extra registers and logic
to the processor to allow BlueChip to save state and recover from BlueChip
exceptions, even when the software disables interrupts. However, this addi-
tional state and logic would have required encoding several implementation-
specific details of the hardware design into BlueChip, potentially making it
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more difficult to insert BlueChip logic automatically. Given the infrequency
of disabling interrupts for long periods in modern commodity operating sys-
tems, we decided to use existing processor exception delivery mechanisms. If
a particular choice of hardware and software makes this unacceptable, there
are several straightforward approaches to addressing this issue, such as using
a hypervisor with some additional support for BlueChip.
BlueChip emulates around BlueChip exceptions by using different instruc-
tions to emulate computations that depend on hardware removed by BlueChip.
In our current design we implement this emulation technique manually for
all instructions in the processor’s instruction set. However, we still rely on
portions of the OS and exception handling code to save and restore the sys-
tem states we emulate around. It might be possible for these instructions
to inadvertently invoke an unrecoverable BlueChip exception by executing
an instruction that causes a BlueChip exception. One way to avoid unre-
coverable BlueChip exceptions could be to modify the compiler to emit only
a small set of Turing complete instructions for the BlueChip software, such
as nand, load, and store instructions. Then we could focus our testing or
formal methods efforts on this subset of the instruction set to decrease the
probability of an unrecoverable BlueChip exception. This technique would
likely make the BlueChip software slower because it potentially uses more
instructions to carry out equivalent computations, but it could decrease the
occurrence of unrecoverable BlueChip exceptions.
5.4 Detecting suspicious circuits
This section describes our detection algorithm for identifying suspicious cir-
cuits automatically within a hardware design. We focus on automatically
detecting potentially malicious logic embedded within the HDL source code
of a design, and we perform our detection during the design phase of the
hardware design life cycle.
Our goal is to develop an algorithm that identifies malicious circuits with-
out identifying benign circuits. In addition, our technique should be difficult
for an attacker to avoid, and it should identify potentially malicious code
automatically without requiring the defender to develop a new set of design
verification tests specifically for our new detection algorithm.
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Hardware designs often include extensive design verification tests that de-
signers use to verify the functionality of a component. In general, test cases
use a set of inputs and verify that the hardware circuit outputs the expected
results. For example, test cases for processors use a sequence of instructions
as the input, with the processor registers and system memory as outputs.
Our approach is to use design verification tests to help detect attack cir-
cuits. If an attack circuit contaminates the output for a test case, the designer
would know that the circuit is operating out-of-spec, potentially detecting
the attack. However, recent research has shown how hardware attacks can
be implemented using small circuits that are designed not to trigger during
routine testing [4]. This evasion technique works by guarding the attack
circuit with triggering logic that enables the attack only when it observes a
specific sequence of events or a specific data value (e.g.,, the attack triggers
only when the hardware encounters a predefined 128-bit value). This attack-
hiding technique works because malicious hardware designers can avoid per-
turbing outputs during testing by hiding deep within the vast state space
of a design,1 but can still enable attacks in the field by inducing the trigger
sequence. Our proposal is to consider circuits suspicious whenever they are
included in a design but do not affect any outputs during testing.
5.4.1 Straw-man approach: code coverage
One possible approach to identifying potentially malicious circuits could be
to use code coverage. Code coverage is defined as the percentage of lines of
code that are executed, out of those possible. Because attackers will likely
try to avoid affecting outputs during testing, highlighting uncovered lines of
code seems like a viable approach to identifying potentially malicious circuits.
An attacker can easily craft circuits that are covered completely by testing,
but never trigger an attack. For example, Figure 5.4 shows a multiplexer
(mux) circuit that can be covered fully without outputting the attack value.
If the verification test suite includes control states 00, 01, and 10, all lines
of code that make up the circuit will be covered, but the output will always
be “Good”. We apply this evasion technique for some of the attacks we
evaluated (Section 5.6) and find that it does evade code coverage detection.
1A processor with 16 32-bit registers, a 16k instruction cache, a 64k data cache, and

















X <= (Ctl(0) = ‘0’) ? Good : Attack!
Y <= (Ctl(1) = ‘0’) ? Good : Attack!
Out <= (Ctl(0) = ‘0’) ? X : Y!
1023!4"
Figure 5.4: Circuit diagram and HDL source code for a mux that can pass code
coverage testing without enabling the attack. This figure shows how a well-crafted
mux can pass coverage tests when the appropriate control states (Ctl(0) and
Ctl(1)) are triggered during testing. Control states 00, 01, and 10 will fully cover
the circuit without triggering the attack condition.
Although code coverage can complicate the attacker’s task of avoiding
testing, this technique can be defeated because code coverage misses the
fundamental property of malicious circuits: attackers are likely to avoid af-
fecting outputs during testing, otherwise they would be caught. Instead,
what defenders need is a technique that zeros in on this property to identify
potentially malicious circuits more reliably.
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// step one: generate data-flow graph
// and find connected pairs
pairs = {connected data-flow pairs}
// step two: simulate and try to find
// any logic that does not affect the
// data-flow pairs
foreach simulation clock cycle
foreach pair in pairs
if the sink and source not equal
remove the pair from the pairs set






Figure 5.6: Data-flow graph for mux replacement circuit.
5.4.2 Unused circuit identification
This section describes our algorithm, called unused circuit identification
(UCI), for identifying potentially malicious circuits at design time. Our tech-
nique focuses on identifying portions of the circuit that do not affect outputs
during testing.
To identify potentially malicious circuits, our algorithm performs two steps
(Figure 5.5). First, UCI creates a data-flow graph for our circuit (Figure 5.6).
In this graph, nodes are signals (wires) and state elements; edges indicate
data flow between the nodes. Based on this data-flow graph, UCI generates a
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list of all signal pairs, or data-flow pairs, where data flows from a source signal
to a sink signal. This list of data-flow pairs includes both direct dependencies
(e.g.,, (Good, X) in Figure 5.6) and indirect dependencies (e.g.,, (Good, Out)
in Figure 5.6).
Second, UCI simulates the HDL code using design verification tests to find
the set of data-flow pairs where intermediate logic does not affect the data
that flows between the source and sink signals. To test for this condition,
at each simulation step UCI checks for inequality for each of our remain-
ing data-flow pairs. If the elements of a pair are not equal, this implies,
conservatively, that the logic in between the two pairs has an effect on the
value, thus we remove pairs with unequal elements from our data-flow-pairs
set. For registers, UCI accounts for latched data by maintaining a history of
simulation values, allowing it make the appropriate comparison for tracking
signal propagation.
After the simulation completes, UCI has a set of remaining data-flow pairs
where the logic in between the pairs does not affect the signal value from
source to sink. In other words, we could replace the intermediate logic with
a wire, possibly including some delay registers, and it would not affect the
overall behavior of the circuit in any way for our design verification tests.
Consider how this algorithm works for the mux-replacement circuit shown
in Figure 5.4:
1. UCI initially creates the set of all possible data-flow pairs, which for our
circuit is (Good,X), (Attack,X), (Good,Y), (Attack,Y), (Good,Out),
(Attack,Out), (X,Out), and (Y,Out).
2. UCI considers the first simulation step where the control signals are
00 and the output is Good, X is Good, and Y is Good. This removes
(Attack,X), (Attack,Y), and (Attack,Out).
3. UCI considers the second simulation step where the control signals are
01 and the output is Good, X is Good, and Y is Attack. This removes
(Good,Y) and (Y,Out).
4. UCI considers the third simulation step where the control signals are
10 and the output is Good, X is Attack, and Y is Good. This removes















rout.su <= attack_en ? 1 : rin.su! su_blue <= attack_en ? 1 : rin.su!
rout.su <= rin.su!
blue_ex <= su_blue != rin.su !
(a) UCI identifies attack (b) BlueChip transforms HDL to remove attack 
Figure 5.7: HDL code and circuit diagram for HDL transformations BlueChip
makes to remove an attack from a design. This figure shows (a) the original
design where an attacker can transition the processor into supervisor mode by
asserting the attack en signal. During design verification, UCI detects that the
value for rout.su always equals rin.su, thus identifying the mux as a candidate
for removal. Part (b) shows how BlueChip removes this logic by connecting
rin.su to rout.su directly and adds exception notification logic to notify
software of any inconsistencies at runtime.
5. UCI finishes the simulation and is left with (Good,Out) in the list
of data-flow pairs where intermediate logic does not affect the signal
propagation.
The resulting output from UCI for this example identifies the malicious
circuit without identifying any additional signals. Because it systematically
identifies circuits that avoid affecting outputs during testing, BlueChip con-
nects the “Good” signal directly to the “Out” signal, thus removing the
malicious elements from the design.
5.4.3 UCI limitations
In Section 5.8 we show that UCI successfully identifies the malicious circuits
for the hardware-level footholds we developed. In this section we discuss
ways an attacker could hide malicious circuits from UCI.
First, an attacker could include malicious test cases that check attack states
incorrectly. By including these malicious test cases in the design verification
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test suite an attacker could fool the system designer into thinking that the
out-of-spec modifications are in fact in-spec, thus slipping the attack past
UCI. However, design verification tests work at a higher level of abstraction,
making it easier for system designers to verify the results independently. In
fact, the BlueChip software includes code for instruction-level emulation of
the processor’s instruction set, and we use this emulation code on our test
cases to verify that the test suite checks states correctly.
Second, an attacker could avoid UCI by crafting malicious circuits that
affect unchecked outputs. Unchecked outputs could arise from incomplete
test cases or from unspecified output states. For example, the memory model
in the SPARC processor specification provides freedom for an implementation
to relax consistency between processors in a multi-processor system [105].
This type of implementation-specific behavior could be used by an attacker
who affects outputs that might be difficult for a testing program to check
deterministically, thus causing malicious circuits to affect outputs and avoid
our analysis. However, this evasion technique requires the attacker to trigger
the attack during design verification, thus tests that check implementation-
specific states and events could detect the foothold directly.
Third, to simplify the analysis of the HDL source, our current UCI im-
plementation excludes mux control signals from the data-flow graph. If an
attacker could use only mux control signals to modify architecturally visible
states directly, UCI would miss the attack. However, this limitation is only
an artifact of our current implementation and would likely be remedied if we
included mux control signals in our analysis.
5.5 Using UCI results in BlueChip
This section discusses how BlueChip uses the results from UCI to eliminate
the effects of suspicious circuits. UCI outputs a set of data-flow pairs, where
each pair has a source element, a sink element, and a delay element. Con-
ceptually, the source and the sink element can be connected directly by a
wire containing delay number of registers, effectively short circuiting the sig-
nals with a delay line. This removes the effects of any intermediate logic
between the source and the sink. BlueChip implements this short-circuit
by performing a source-to-source transformation on the design’s HDL source
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code.
Once UCI generates a set of data-flow pairs, the pairs are fed into the
BlueChip system (transformation pictured in Figure 5.7). BlueChip takes
these pairs as an input and replaces the suspicious circuits by modifying
the HDL code using three steps. First, BlueChip creates a backup version
of each sink in the list of pairs. The backup version of a signal holds the
value that would have been assigned to the signal in the original circuit.
Second, BlueChip adds a new assignment to the original signal. The value
assigned to the original signal is simply the value of the source element in the
pair, creating a short circuit between the source and the sink. The rest of
the design will see this short-circuited value, while the BlueChip exception
generation hardware sees the backed-up version. The third and final step
consists of adding the BlueChip exception generation logic to the source file.
This circuit compares the backed-up value of the sink element with the source
value. BlueChip generates an exception whenever any of these comparisons
are not true. When a BlueChip exception occurs, it signals that the hardware
was about to enter a state that was not seen during testing. From here, the
BlueChip software is responsible for making forward progress.
The HDL transformation algorithm also must handle multiple data-flow
pairs that share the same sink signal but have different sources. This situation
could potentially cause problems for BlueChip because it is unclear which
source signal to short-circuit to the original sink signal. Our solution is to
pick one pair for the sink signal assignment, but include exception generation
logic for all pairs that share the same sink element. This means that all
violations are detected, but the sink may be shorted with the source that
caused the exception. This untested state is safe because (1) BlueChip asserts
exceptions immediately when detecting an inconsistency between the original
design and the modified circuit, (2) BlueChip checks all data-flow pairs for
inconsistencies, and (3) BlueChip leverages hardware recovery mechanisms
to prevent the persistence of untrusted state modifications.
5.6 Malicious hardware footholds
This section describes the malicious hardware trojans we used to test the ef-
fectiveness of BlueChip. Prior work on developing hardware attacks focused
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on adding minimal additional logic gates as a starting point for a system-
level attack [4]. We call this type of hardware mechanism a foothold. We
explored three such footholds. The first foothold, called the supervisor tran-
sition foothold, enables an attacker to transition the processor into supervi-
sor mode to escalate the privileges of user-mode code. The second foothold,
called the memory redirection foothold, enables an attacker to read and write
arbitrary virtual memory locations. The third foothold, called the shadow
mode foothold, enables an attacker to pass control to invisible firmware lo-
cated within the processor and take control of the system. Previous work has
shown how these types of footholds can be used as part of a system-level at-
tack to carry out high-level, high-value attacks, such as escalating privileges
of a process or enabling attackers to login to a remote system automatically
[4].
5.6.1 Supervisor transition foothold
Our supervisor transition foothold provides a hardware mechanism that al-
lows unprivileged programs to transition the processor into supervisor mode.
This transition grants access to privileged instructions and bypasses the usual
hardware-enforced protections, allowing the attacker to escalate the privileges
of an otherwise unprivileged process.
The malicious hardware is triggered when it observes a sequence of in-
structions being executed by the processor. This attack sequence can be
arbitrarily long to avoid false positives, and the particular sequence is hard
coded into the hardware. This foothold requires relatively few transistors.
We implement it by including a small state machine in the integer unit (i.e.,,
the pipeline) of the processor that looks for the triggering sequence of in-
structions, and asserts the supervisor-mode bit when enabled.
5.6.2 Memory redirection foothold
Our memory redirection foothold provides hardware support for unprivileged
malicious software by allowing an attacker to access arbitrary virtual memory
locations.
This foothold uses a sequence of bytes as the trigger. In this case, when
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the foothold observes store instructions with a particular sequence of byte
values it then interprets the subsequent bytes as the redirection address. The
malicious logic records the address of the block and the redirection address
in hardware registers. The next time the address is loaded from memory,
the malicious hardware substitutes the redirection address as the address to
be loaded and asserts the supervisor bit passed to the memory management
unit (MMU). That is, the next read to this block will return the value of a
different location in the memory. Memory writes are handled analogously,
in that the next write to the block is redirected to write to the redirection
address. The net effect is providing full access to arbitrary virtual memory
locations and bypassing MMU protections enforced in the processor.
This foothold provides flexibility for attackers because attackers can trig-
ger the circuit using only data values. Attackers can trigger the foothold
by injecting specific data values into a system using a number of techniques
including unsolicited network packets, emails, and images on web sites. By
using these mechanisms to arbitrarily manipulate the system’s memory, a re-
mote attacker can compromise the system, for example, by searching mem-
ory for encryption keys, disabling authentication checks by modifying the
memory of the targeted system, or altering executable code running on the
system.
5.6.3 Shadow mode foothold
The shadow mode foothold allows an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary
code. The shadow mode foothold works by monitoring data values as they
pass between the cache and the pipeline, and installs an invisible firmware
within the processor when a specific value triggers the attack. When this
firmware runs, it runs with full processor privileges, it can gain control of the
processor at any time, and it remains hidden from software running on the
system. To provide storage for exploit instructions and data, this foothold
reserves blocks in the instruction and data caches for storing injected in-
structions and data. The shadow mode foothold is triggered with a sequence
of bytes and the shadow mode foothold interprets the bytes following the
trigger sequence as commands and machine instructions.
To evaluate BlueChip, we implement the “bootstrap trigger” portion of
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the shadow mode foothold. The bootstrap trigger waits for a predetermined
value to be stored to the data cache, and asserts a processor exception that
transfers control to a hard-coded “bootstrap code” that resides within the
processor cache. Our implementation includes the “bootstrap trigger” and
asserts a processor exception, but omits the “bootstrap code” portion of the
foothold. As a result, we are unable to implement full system attacks using
our version of the foothold, but it does give us enough of the functionality
of the shadow mode foothold to enable us to evaluate our defense because
removing the “bootstrap trigger” disables the attack.
5.7 BlueChip prototype
To experimentally verify the BlueChip approach, we prototyped the hard-
ware, the software, and the design-time UCI analysis algorithm.
We based our hardware implementation on the Leon3 processor [88] de-
sign. Our prototype is fully synthesizable and runs on an FPGA development
board that includes a Virtex 5 FPGA, CompactFlash, Ethernet, USB, VGA,
PS/2, and RS-232 ports. The Leon3 processor implements the SPARC v8
instruction set [105] and our configuration uses eight register windows, a 16
KB instruction cache, a 64 KB data cache, includes an MMU, and runs at 100
MHz, which is the maximum clock rate we are able to achieve for the unmod-
ified Leon3 design, for our target FPGA. For the software, we use a SPARC
port of the Linux 2.6.21.1 kernel on our FPGA board and we install a full
Slackware distribution on our system. By evaluating BlueChip on an FPGA
development board and by using commodity software, we have a realistic
environment for evaluating our hardware modifications and accompanying
software systems.
To insert our BlueChip hardware modifications, we wrote tools that take
as input data-flow pairs generated by our UCI implementation and auto-
matically transforms the Leon3 VHDL source code to replace suspicious
circuits and add exception delivery logic. Our tool is mostly hardware-
implementation agnostic and should work on a wide range of hardware de-
signs automatically. The only hardware implementation specific portions of
our tool are for connecting the BlueChip logic to the Leon3 exception han-
dling stage.
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For our UCI implementation, we wrote a VHDL compiler front end in
Java which generates a data-flow graph from arbitrary HDL source code,
determines all possible pairs of edges in the data-flow graph, then uses TCL
to automatically drive ModelSim, running the simulation and removing pairs
that are violated during testing. The last stage of our UCI implementation
performs a source-to-source transformation using the original VHDL design
and remaining data-flow pairs to generate a design with BlueChip hardware.
Our BlueChip software runs as an exception handler within the Linux
kernel. The BlueChip emulation code is written in C and it can emulate all
non-privileged SPARC instructions and most of the privileged operations of
the Leon3 SPARC implementation. Because SPARC is a reduced instruction
set computer (RISC), we implemented our emulator using only 1759 lines of
code and it took us about a week to implement our instruction emulation
routines.
We identify suspicious hardware using three sets of tests: the basic test
suite included with the Leon3 distribution, SPARC certification test cases
from SPARC International, and five additional test cases to test portions
of the instruction set specification that are uncovered by the basic Leon3
and SPARC certification test cases. To identify suspicious logic, we simulate
the HDL using ModelSim version 6.5 and perform the UCI analysis on the
simulation results. Our analysis focuses on the integer unit (i.e.,, the core
pipeline) of the Leon3 processor.
5.8 BlueChip evaluation
This section describes our evaluation of BlueChip. In our evaluation, we mea-
sure BlueChip’s: (1) ability to stop attacks, (2) ability to successfully emulate
instructions that used hardware removed by BlueChip, and (3) hardware and
software overheads.
5.8.1 Methodology
To evaluate BlueChip’s ability to prevent and recover from attacks, we wrote
software that activates the malicious hardware described in Section 5.7. We
designed the software to activate and exploit the low-level footholds imple-
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mented by our attacks, and tested to see if these out-of-spec abstractions
were rendered powerless and if the system could make post attack progress.
To identify suspicious circuits, we used three different sets of hardware
design verification tests. First, we used the Gaisler test suite that comes
bundled with the Leon3 hardware’s HDL code. These test cases use ISA-
level instructions to test both the processor core and peripheral (i.e.,, out-
side the processor core) units like the caches, memory management unit, and
system-on-chip units such as the UART. Second, we used the official SPARC
verification tests from SPARC International, which are used to ensure com-
patibility with the SPARC instruction set. These test cases are designed
to confirm that a processor implements the instructions and architecturally
visible states needed to be considered a SPARC processor, but they are not
intended to be a complete design verification suite. Third, we created a small
set of custom hardware test cases to improve design coverage, closer to what
is common in a production environment. The custom test cases cover gaps in
the Gaisler test cases and exercises instructions that Leon3 supports, but are
optional in the SPARC ISA specification (e.g.,, floating-point operations).
To measure execution overhead, we used three workloads that stressed
different parts of the system: wget fetches an HTML document from the
Web and represents a network bound workload, make compiles portions of
the ntpdate application and stresses the interaction between kernel and user
modes, and djpeg decompresses a 1MB jpeg image as a representative of
a compute-bound workload. To address variability in the measurements,
reported execution time results are the average of 100 executions of each
workload relative to an uninstrumented base hardware configuration. All of
our overhead experiments have a 95% confidence interval of less than 1% of
the average execution time.
5.8.2 Does BlueChip prevent the attacks?
There are two goals for BlueChip when aiming to defend against malicious
hardware. The first and most important goal is to prevent attacks from influ-
encing the state of the system. The second goal is for the system to recover,
allowing non-malicious programs to make progress after an attempted attack.









Figure 5.8: BlueChip attack prevention and recovery.
three attacks, meeting the primary goal for success. BlueChip meets the
secondary goal of recovery for two of the three attacks, but it fails to recover
from attempted activations of the memory redirection attack. In this case,
the attack is prevented, but software emulation is unable to make forward
progress. Upon further examination, we found that the Leon3’s built-in
pipeline recovery mechanism was insufficient to clear the attack’s internal
state. This lack of progress is due to the attack circuit ignoring the Leon3
control signal that resets registers on pipeline flushes, thus making some
attack states persist even after pipeline flushes. This situation causes the
BlueChip hardware to repeatedly trap to software, thus blocking forward
progress, but preventing the attack. Our analysis indicates that augmenting
Leon3’s existing recovery mechanism to provide additional state recovery
would allow BlueChip to recover from this attack as well.
5.8.3 Is software emulation successful?
BlueChip justifies its aggressive identification and removal of suspicious cir-
cuits by relying on software to emulate any mistakenly removed functional-
ity. Thus, BlueChip will trigger spurious exceptions (i.e.,, those exceptions
that result from removal of logic mistakenly identified as malicious). In our
experiments, all of the benchmarks execute correctly, indicating BlueChip
correctly recovers from the spurious BlueChip exceptions that occurred in
these workloads.
Figure 5.9 shows the average rate of BlueChip exceptions for each bench-
mark. Even in the worst case, where a BlueChip exception occurs every
20ms on average, the frequency is far less than the operating system’s timer
interrupt frequency. The rate of BlueChip exceptions is low enough to allow
for complex software handlers without sacrificing performance.



















Figure 5.9: BlueChip software invocation frequencies.
of UCI. This figure shows the number of suspicious pairs remaining after
each stage of testing. The misidentified pairs, which are all false positives
for our tests, are the number of suspicious pairs minus the number of attack
pairs detected. These false positive pairs can manifest themselves as spurious
BlueChip exceptions during runtime. The number of pairs remaining after
testing affects the likelihood of seeing spurious BlueChip exceptions, with
fewer pairs generally leading to less frequent traps. Even though some of the
remaining pairs result in spurious exceptions, the instruction-level emulation
provided by BlueChip software hides this behavior from the rest of the sys-
tem, thus allowing unmodified applications to execute unaware that they are
running on BlueChip hardware.
The discrepancy in the number of traps experienced by each benchmark
is also worth noting. The make benchmark experiences the most traps, by
almost an order of magnitude. Looking at the UCI pairs that fire during
testing, and looking at the type of workload make creates, the higher rate of



















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.11: Application runtime overheads for BlueChip systems.
more often in make than the other benchmarks, as make creates a new process
for each compilation. More in-depth tracing of the remaining UCI pairs
reveals that many pairs surround the interaction between kernel mode and
user mode. Because UCI is inherently based on design verification tests, this
perhaps indicates the parts of hardware least tested in our three test suites.
Conversely, the relatively small rate of BlueChip exceptions experienced by
wget is due to its I/O (network) bound workload. Most of the time is spent
waiting for packets, which apparently does not violate any of the UCI pairs
remaining after testing.
5.8.4 Is BlueChip’s runtime overhead low?
Although BlueChip successfully executes our benchmark workloads, frequent
spurious exceptions have the potential to significantly impact system perfor-




Attack (W) (Luts) (MHz)
Privilege Escalation 0.41% 1.38% 0.00%
Memory Redirection 0.47% 1.19% 5.00%
Shadow Mode 0.29% 0.31% 0.00%
Figure 5.12: BlueChip hardware overheads for each of our attacks.
Figure 5.11 shows the normalized breakdown of runtime overhead experi-
enced by the benchmarks running on a BlueChip system versus an unpro-
tected system. The runtime overhead from the software portion of BlueChip
is just 0.3% on average. The software overhead comes from handling spurious
BlueChip exceptions, primarily from just two of the UCI pairs. The average
overhead from the hardware portions of BlueChip is approximately 1.4%.
Figure 5.12 shows the relative cost of BlueChip in terms of power, device
area, and maximum operating frequency. The hardware overhead in terms
of area averages less than 1% of the entire design. Even though BlueChip
needs hardware to monitor the remaining pairs, much of the hardware already
exists and BlueChip just taps the pre-existing signals. The majority of the
area overhead comes from the comparisons used to determine if a BlueChip
exception is required given the state of the pipeline. To reduce BlueChip’s
impact on maximum frequency, these comparisons happen in parallel and
BlueChip’s exception generation uses a tree of logical-OR operations. In fact,
for the privilege escalation and shadow mode versions of BlueChip, there is no
measurable impact on maximum frequency, indicating that UCI pair checking
hardware is typically off the critical path. For the memory redirection attack
hardware design, some of the pair checking logic is placed on the memory
path, which is the critical path for this design and target device. In this
case, the maximum frequency is reduced by five percent. Consistent with
the small amount of additional hardware, the power overhead averages less
than 0.5%.
5.9 Conclusions
BlueChip neutralizes malicious hardware introduced at design time by identi-
fying and removing suspicious hardware during the design verification phase,
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while using software at runtime to emulate hardware instructions to avoid
erroneously removed circuitry.
Experiments indicate that BlueChip is successful at identifying and pre-
venting attacks while allowing non-malicious executions to make progress.
Our malicious circuit identification algorithm, UCI, relies on the attempts
to hide functionality to identify candidate circuits for removal. BlueChip
replaces circuits identified by UCI with exception logic, which initiates a
trap to software. The BlueChip software emulates instructions to detour
around the removed hardware, allowing the system to attempt to make for-
ward progress. Measurements taken with the attacks inserted show that such
exceptions are infrequent when running a commodity operating system using
traditional applications.
In summary, these results show that addressing the malicious insider prob-
lem for hardware design is both possible and worthwhile, and that approaches




The reference implementations presented in this dissertation show that it is
possible to detect a range of processor imperfections and help software make
consistent forward progress. Experiments with the reference implementations
show that detection and recovery are practical. Experiments also expose
limitations with the current incarnations, motivating future work.
The major limitation of BlueChip is its inability to make guarantees—or
any concrete claims—about the likelihood of recovery. As discussed previ-
ously, the likelihood of recovery is dependent on the functional redundancy of
the processor with respect to the imperfection. Processor designers currently
have no way to systematically adjust functional redundancy or focus verifica-
tion effort to increase the chances of recovery. Future work makes BlueChip
more palatable to processor designers by creating a feedback loop that not
only provides information on the bounds of recovery, but leads towards a
formally verified recovery primitive.
Another major limitation, exposed by the experiments with Erratacator,
is that it is not practical to detect arbitrary processor imperfections (which
number into the hundreds [106, 3, 107]), given the current state of research.
Future work will look to guard only a subset of the processor from the ISA
level, which is more regular and less complex than the hardware or microar-
chitectural level. This way, processor designers can determine the most criti-
cal parts of the interface to software (e.g., privileged state or recovery primi-
tive support) and protect it, relying on lower overhead methods of protection
for non-critical functionality.
The end goal of the proposed future research is the creation of a automat-
ically generated, formally verified, general purpose, and execution-protected
recovery primitive. The main advantage of the proposed recovery primitive
being that it is essentially free as it reuses existing processor functionality—
no added area, power, or complexity—and adds no run time overhead to
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software.
6.1 Guaranteeing forward progress
BlueChip, as it stands, is a proof-of-concept, not ready for adoption by com-
mercial processor designers. First, the recovery routines used in the refer-
ence implementations were either targeted to the imperfection, or used the
general-purpose instruction set simulator. The targeted recovery routines
provide a higher assurance of recovery at the expense of the labor required
to manually inspect the HDL and code a custom recovery routine in assem-
bly. It is impractical to expect processor designers to do this and not make
an error. Second, with the general-purpose simulator, you have no sense
of the average recovery time: the simulator just attempts different recod-
ing algorithms, until one works, or until failure is reached. This leads to
the third limitation, that there is no way for processor designers to know
what the likelihood of recovery is. These limitations mean that processor de-
signers cannot make intelligent tradeoffs: Adding functional redundancy to
increase the likelihood of recovery or to decrease the average recovery time.
Or, manipulating functionality to enable complete formal verification.
To address these limitations, making BlueChip ready for use in commercial
processors, we propose enhancements to BlueChip that create a feedback
loop, informing processor designers how the processor’s functionality impacts
formal verification, likelihood of recovery, and average recovery time. The
proposal consists of two parts: identifying the functionality amenable to
formal verification and identifying the functionality sufficient for forward
progress. By combining the two parts, we can identify a subset of processor
functionality that enables complete formal verification and is also sufficient
to guarantee software’s forward progress, allowing BlueChip to become an
almost no cost recovery primitive.
The idea of repurposing existing processor functionality for recovery dif-
fers from previous hardware-based approaches in that the proposed system
requires no other component to guarantee software’s forward progress. Previ-
ous proposals require additional, fully-functional processing units: typically,
a fault-free system [108] or a simplified processor tightly coupled to the main
processor [10]. In remote approaches, recovery times are on the order of sec-
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onds and users must pay for the remote system even though they rarely use
it. In local approaches, while recovery times approach zero, the added pro-
cessors increase the chip’s area and power draw. The increased area makes
chips more expensive to produce, while the added power draw makes them
more expensive to operate. A final drawback is that both approaches strictly
increase the complexity of the system, increasing the likelihood of creating
new—potentially unrecoverable—bugs. With all these penalties, users and
processor designers end-up paying more for a less productive system.
The proposed work involves answering three questions: (1) What is the
relationship between functionality and verifiability? (2) What is the relation-
ship between functionality and the likelihood of forward progress? (3) Is it
possible to create a feedback mechanism that helps designers tradeoff func-
tionality for verifiability or recoverability? With these questions answered,
processor designers can replace the added complexity and overheads of tra-
ditional hardware-only functional redundancy with a systematic repurposing
of pre-existing processor functionality that is useful in the common case.
6.1.1 Functionality vs. verifiability
The idea here is to explore if certain parts of a processor’s functionality are
more difficult to verify than others. This differs from previous research into
the formal verification of processors in that previous proposals took a mi-
croarchitectural view, making processors more amenable to verification by
ignoring their internal workings, e.g., pipelining [74]. The problem is that
processors do not run with their pipelines disabled. We approach the prob-
lem from an instruction perspective: looking at which instructions we can
eliminate support for to decrease verification effort. Taken to the extreme,
the question becomes, “Is it possible to verify this processor if it only sup-
ports one instruction?” If it is possible we observe the effects of adding
new instructions. This exposes to processor designers a fresh opportunity to
tradeoff known correct functionality for verification effort.
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6.1.2 Functionality vs. forward progress
The idea here is to identify small subsets of a processor’s instruction-level
functionality, which have the same expressive power as the entire ISA. In
the ideal case, we would reduce the subsets down to a kernel of functionality
that is not both sufficient and necessary to make forward progress guarantees.
Proving that the kernel of functionality is both necessary and sufficient needs
to be done both theoretically, by showing that the ISA-level effects from
any instruction in the ISA can be reproduced using only instructions in the
subset and that removing any instruction from the subset breaks the previous
statement, and realistically, by showing the no limitations due to the physical
implementation cause a loss of expressiveness. An example of a limitation
imposed by the implementation that is not covered in the ISA is the Byte
Bus on the OR1200. Accesses to the Byte Bus must use the byte-wide load
and store instructions; anything else is an error, resulting in an exception.
This physical limitation means that any kernel of functionality must include
the byte-wide load and store instructions.
Once we find and prove equivalent the kernel of functionality for the pro-
cessor, other questions arise. Is it possible and beneficial (e.g., easier to
formally verify) to limit the functionality of the instructions that make up
the kernel? What is the overhead of recoding each instruction not in the
kernel using only instructions in the kernel? How does recovery overhead
and formal verification overhead change as we add more instructions to the
kernel?
6.1.3 Implications
When processor designers can understand the formal verification and recov-
ery consequences of adding or removing functionality to the ISA, they will
have the power to systematically design instruction sets with verification and
use in mind. It would be less risky for designers to add new functionality, as
they could assure themselves that the recovery subset of processor function-
ality could take over the task in the event of a imperfection. By fabricating
the subset of processor functionality in a larger process or using more robust
circuit elements, processors would be more resilient to single-event-upsets
or attacks that involve running the processor outside the specified operat-
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ing conditions. With the proposed modifications, BlueChip could act as a
minimal hardware TCB.
6.2 Enforcing execution
The ISA specification is the contract between the processor and the software
that wants to run on the processor. The ISA sets the expectations of software.
Software must blindly assume that the processor correctly implements the
ISA, given all possible ISA-level states, referred to as states, and ISA-level
events (i.e., instructions, exceptions, and interrupts), referred to as events.
The problem is that, being complex, processors fail to correctly implement
the ISA. Certain combinations of states and events activate the processor
imperfections, contaminating the state of software. This is especially worri-
some in security-critical systems, where evidence shows that contamination
via processor imperfections has already lead to vulnerabilities in otherwise
correctly functioning software [refs].
The goal of this work is to identify the security-critical subset of a gen-
eralized processor’s state, then to design and build a system that validates
the values of the security-critical subset of state at run time. With such a
system in place, secure software will know that, no matter what, it can rely
on the processor’s abstractions for maintaining privilege, data privacy, and
data integrity.
The main research questions that need to be answered to build such a
system are: (1) How to find a security-critical subset of processor state, (2)
Should the protections be hardware-implemented or software implemented,
(3) What is the best way to validate state, (4) What to do in the event of
contamination, and (5) How to gauge the efficacy of the added protections.
6.2.1 Identifying a security-critical subset
We create a testbed for the system by gathering all security-related errata
from the top three commercial processors released (by units sold) within
the last ten years. From the list of security-related errata, we create classes
of vulnerabilities, which we then implement in our own processor. The re-
implementations have the same contamination of the original, but with the
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freedom to have any trigger: we aim to attack our own defenses. Any attack
that we cannot code an assertion to detect signals a hole in our system.
Choosing this subset of processor functionality makes dynamic verification
practical by reducing the range of functionality required by the verification
engine; remember that the goal is to avoid re-implementing the processor.
Dynamically verifying the entire processor is impractically because it re-
quires building another processor and working it into the system; Diva [refs]is
an example of this. The idea is to identify a subset of processor functionality
that is critical to software, but requires re-implementing a small subset of
process functionality.
6.2.2 Hardware or software protections
The verification needs to be done in hardware as verifying the processor in
software—without risking false negatives—requires stopping the processor
after every instruction and event and running a complex verification algo-
rithm. In addition, software has limited visibility into the events inside a
processor. As discussed in Section 6.2.6, software is best suited at monitor-
ing general-purpose state in a practical manner.
6.2.3 Detecting contamination
The role of the detectors is to detect, at run time, any out-of-specification
updates to the protected subset of the processor’s ISA-level state. This re-
quires both hooks into the processor’s ISA-level state and a way to encode
the ISA in hardware, without implementing another processor.
By hooking into the processor’s state, the detectors are able to track the
value of each protected state element. To accomplish this processor designers
need to specify which HDL variable names comprise ISA-level state elements.
Experience with the two reference designs presented in this dissertation shows
that the difficulty of identifying all of the ISA-level state varies depending
on the language and implementation style used by the processor’s designers.
Once the processor designers identify all of the ISA state, the detectors will
be able to track all changes to it, down to the clock cycle.
Given the processors state, the detectors need a way to determine if the
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current value is outside of what you would expect give the previous state,
the instruction, and the ISA specification. The detectors must check not
only updates to the protected state, but must check for cases of a missing
update. For example, a privilege escalation attack has the processor go from
user to supervisor mode in an out-of-specification way, but it is also possible
to create a privilege anti-de-escalation attack, where the processor remains
in supervisor mode when it should have gone to user mode (e.g., a return
from exception).
We map these two possible attack vectors—a surreptitious change and a
disregarded change—as violations of two different implications: If protected
state X changes, then event Y must have occurred. If event Y occurred, then
protected state X must have changed. It is possible to encode the specifi-
cation as a set of implications. Going back to the privilege example, the
specification says that privilege can only escalate (P esc) in the event of a re-
set (rst) or an exception/interrupt/system call (eisc enter). The specification
also says that upon return from a exception/interrupt/system call (eisc exit),
the privilege bit (P) is set to what it was before the call (P PRE EISC). Af-
ter encoding these rules as implications we get, P esc −→ (rst or eisc enter)
and eisc exit −→ (P == P PRE EISC). This motivates the use of assertions
to verify that these implications hold.
The challenges are identifying a good set of ISA-level state that enables
expressive assertions and set of operations that supports the required com-
parisons of state and events.
6.2.4 Recovering from contamination
It is not sufficient to stop at detecting state contamination, because the
contaminated state may not be flushed away and software is likely to trigger
the imperfection again, locking the system. These issues necessitate the
addition of a recovery module that takes control after a detection, clears any
remaining contamination, makes it unlikely that software will re-trigger the
imperfection, and finally passes full control of the processor back to software.
The first role of the recovery module is to remove any state contamination
due to the imperfection. The ideal is to rollback the entire ISA-level state of
the process to what it was before the imperfection was triggered. The ideal is
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not practical as it requires full-system checkpointing support. Checkpointing
just the security-critical state is not sufficient, because even though only the
security-critical subset of state is protected (i.e., a recovery firmware acti-
vation is only due to a detected contamination of the security-critical state)
a complete decontamination might require modifications to general-purpose
state. For example, if an ADD instruction somehow clobbers any array of
general-purpose registers, while setting the privilege bit to Supervisor mode,
it would be prudent to clean-up the entire mess, not just set the privilege
bit back to User mode. Experiments with the reference implementation will
shed more light on the issue.
If we just look at decontaminating security-critical state, two options arise:
setting the state to an obvious value given the type of imperfection detected
(e.g., privilege bit to 0 (User mode) after an out-of-spec privilege escalation
attempt) and setting the state to a known safe value known safe value (e.g.,
make page as invalid after a out-of-spec modification of the hardware page
table registers). Note that these two cases are not exhaustive.
The second role of the recovery module is to help software make forward
progress, with little chance of re-triggering the imperfection. For this, we
rely on the previously proposed general-purpose instruction set simulator,
because it is formally guaranteed to push software state forward and much
more lightweight.
The simulator is not enough to prevent an the re-triggering of an imperfec-
tion. Making re-triggering unlikely requires resetting the imperfections trig-
ger sequence back to its starting state. Previous work shows that a pipeline
flush is not capable of guaranteeing this [45]. To guarantee a reset of the
trigger sequence requires resetting the hardware state.
6.2.5 Testing the protections
To verify that the proposed protections work, we implement an attack that
represents each class of processor imperfection found in Section 6.2.1. The
attacks have the same spirit of the effect listed in the errata documents, but
are not exact reproductions since our goal is to expose weaknesses in the
design and since the processors differ greatly. After adding the attacks to
the reference implementation and developing a code sequence that triggers
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the imperfection, we run benchmarks intermixed with the trigger sequence,
checking for unhandled state contamination.
Using the attack testbed not only exposes any holes in the approach, both
gives an idea of the real-world overheads of using such a defense.
6.2.6 Limitations
There are two limitations to the proposed mechanism, one, it will not detect
contamination of the general-purpose subset of a processor’s state. This is
by design, as protecting all of a processor’s state requires an artifact with the
same complexity as the first, which is not practical. Also there are alternative
software-based mechanisms that exist for validating general purpose state,
e.g., redundant execution [34, 41, 109], which are made practical by apply-
ing them on a per-process basis. Note that these techniques cannot verify
the security-critical subset of the processor, thus they require the proposed
protections.
Two, it is possible for a processor imperfection to contaminate the proces-
sor’s general-purpose state and have that contamination spread to protected
state. An example of this is a corrupted XOR operation that the occurs when
the operating system is computing page protections. The operating system
will update the paging hardware with an incorrect value, but since the oper-
ating system has the privilege required to update the paging hardware, the
processor behaves within specification in performing the update. We refer to
this as indirect contamination.
Indirect contamination is directly controlled by software through the in-
structions it issues. Any slight modification to the triggering instruction
sequence is likely to avoid the contamination. Considering the fixed nature
of hardware-based attacks and the ease and frequency of software patches,
we feel that indirect contamination is not a serious threat.
6.2.7 Implications
If successful, software could manage its exposure to potential processor im-
perfections, no longer needing to blindly trust the processor to correctly im-
plement abstractions it cannot validate. Processor designers could also forgo
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the often ignored errata documents in favor of providing sets of assertions
that actually fix the problem.
6.3 Conclusion
With feedback on the bounds of recovery, processor designers can concentrate
verification effort on a the subset of the processor required for recovery.
With the ability to enforce a subset of the ISA, software can be confi-
dent that the portion of the hardware interface that it relies on the most is
protected.
Combining guarded execution and a recovery primitive expands the utility
of the recovery primitive beyond processor imperfections. One could imagine
the value of such a combination in environments with transient faults. This





Experiments with both use case implementations show that, in conjunction
with hardware-implemented detectors, SoftPatch is both general purpose and
practical. The detectors are acceptable to hardware designers, because (1)
they do not interact with the processor outside of the exception support logic,
maintains the original design’s complexity and (2) they incur less than 10%
hardware area overhead for the processor bug use case and less than 2% for
the malicious circuit use case. SoftPatch is acceptable to software developers
and users because it quietly maintains the perfect-processor abstraction while
maintaining overheads of less than 10% in real-world tests in both use cases.
Experiences from building the two use case implementations demonstrate
the general purpose nature of SoftPatch. Our observation is that the design
of the detector is independent from the design and verification of the recov-
ery firmware. By formally verifying the equivalence of the many recovery
routines, SoftPatch adapts to different imperfections by employing different
recovery routines in hopes that one will successfully route around the imper-
fection. Only when it becomes important to reduce the execution time of the
recovery routines does knowledge of the imperfection become important.
In the future, we see a usage scenario where processor designers intention-
ally under-verify processor functionality, guarding the under-verified func-
tionality with dynamically configurable detectors that utilize SoftPatch in
the event that post-deployment verification discovers a bug. This allows the
processor designer to explore the trade-off between pre-deployment verifica-
tion, detector overhead, and software run time overhead due to recovery.
This work shows that it is possible and practical to simulate in software
what is missing or defective in hardware without understanding the imper-
fection or imposing on the software.
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